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C. Jurisdiction 
This Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 
§78-2a-3(2)(d), Utah Code Annotated, plus Rules 3 and 4, Utah 
Court of Appeals. 
P. Nature of Proceedings 
This is an Appeal from an Order of the District Court 
denying Defendants' Motion To Set Aside The Judgment And 
Sanctions pursuant to Rules 55 and 60. 
E. Statement of Issues on Appeal 
I. Where Defendants' attorney was activated during certain 
periods of the Desert Storm Crisis which in part lead to certain 
papers not being produced and answered, should the Court upon 
being appraised of the matter set aside the Judgment and 
Sanctions. 
II. Where one of the Defendants, Clare Morse had not 
appeared for several of the Supplemental Orders, should this be a 
part of the criteria for denying the judgment to be set aside 
where Defendant Clare Morse had depended upon his attorney to 
take care of the Supplemental Order. 
F, Determinative Status 
The statutes and Rules which Defendants Clare T. Morse and 
Transamerica Equities, Inc. believe may be determinative are 
copied or set forth in their entirety in Appendix XIV. hereto. 
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STATEMENT OF CASE 
A, Nature of the Case 
The record now before the court establishes the following 
facts that are material to Plaintiff's Motion: 
1. In response to service of the Summons and Complaint in 
the above matter upon the defendants Transamerica Equities, Inc. 
and Clare T. Morse, an answer was filed and served by mail on 
behalf of Transamerica Equities, Inc. and Clare T. Morse on or 
about January 11, 1992. (Affidavit of Grant Orton). 
2. On July 10, 1991, Clare T. Morse and Transamerica 
Equities, Inc. learned for the first time that a Judgment had 
been obtained against Transamerica Equities, Inc. and Clare T. 
Morse in the instant matter when he was personally served by a 
constable with a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings. 
(Affidavit of Grant Orton) 
3. Transamerica Equities, Inc.'s registered agent was never 
served with the Supplemental Order. (Affidavit of Grant Orton) 
4. Defendants' attorney, Grant Orton was out of town on a 
military call up during most of the time period of January -
June, 1992. Grant Orton7s Affidavit states that he had never 
received notice of plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions and Default 
Judgment nor Judgment which followed. (Affidavit of Grant 
Orton). 
5. According to Grant Orton's Affidavit, mail is delivered 
to a mail box in front of the building where his office is 
located. During the months of January thorough May 1991, Grant 
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Orton had numerous military assignments outside of the State of 
Utah. During that time normally the mail would have been 
retained by the Postal Service if his part-time secretary did not 
pick it up in a timely fashion. (Affidavit of Grant Orton). 
In the past when this happened, it has been retained by 
the post office for it to be picked up there. Upon checking with 
the post office Grant Orton found that this was not the case 
since there is no such mail retained by the Postal Service, nor 
had his secretary picked up the mail. In other words, he did not 
receive the mailings from Plaintiffs. (Affidavit of Grant 
Orton). 
6. Had Grant Orton become aware from any source that a 
Motion preliminary to the granting of judgment and sanctions had 
been served in any manner, including by mail, he would have taken 
the action necessary to timely prepare, file and serve an 
appropriate response thereto and he would not have permitted or 
suffered any judgment or sanctions to have been entered against 
the Defendant herein, without his answering said motions. 
(Affidavit of Grant Orton). 
7. Defendants have, hold and claim valid and meritorious 
defenses to each of the claims and issues that are raised in and 
that are the subject of the Complaint and has asserted them in 
his Answer. (Affidavit of Grant Orton). 
8. Defendants Transamerica Equities, Inc. nor Clare T. 
Morse did not receive notice of the Motion for Sanctions and 
Judgment. (Affidavit of Grant Orton, Affidavit of Clare Morse). 
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9. Defendants did not receive Notice of Plaintiffs' Motions 
nor have they found those notices* (Affidavit of Grant Orton, 
Affidavit of Clare Morse). 
10. That Grant Orton was attorney for Defendant Clare T. 
Morse and Transamerica Equities, Inc. and all defenses for 
Transamerica Equities included Morse. (Affidavit of Grant Orton 
and Affidavit of Clare Morse). 
11. That Clare Morse did not receive notice of any of 
Plaintiff's notices. (Affidavit of Clare Morse). 
12. Defendants Clare T. Morse and Transamerica Equities did 
not have notice of any of the lack of response and therefore were 
dependent upon their attorney to represent them in this matter. 
(Affidavit of Clare Morse). 
B, Course of Proceedings 
Clare Morse, upon having received the July 10, 1991 
Supplemental Order and giving it to his attorney Grant Orton to 
have the Court set the Judgment Aside, Grant Orton was again 
called up on active duty, and he and the Defendants requested 
present counsel Wesley Sine to take over the lawsuit for 
Defendants. Well within the 90 days from the time of Judgment, a 
Motion To Set Aside The Judgment was filed by the Defendants. 
C. Disposition At The Hearing 
After a hearing before the Honorable Judge Wilkinson, the 
Court ruled that since Defendant Clare T. Morse had failed to 
show up for two Supplemental Orders that he would not Set the 
Judgment Aside. (See Transcript page 10, lines 5-21, page 11, 
4 
lines 1-4) 
Defendants then in a timely fashion appealed the Court's 
decision to the Utah Supreme Court who through is pour over 
powers transferred this case to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
P. Relevant Facts 
1* According to the Affidavit of Grant Orton, he did not 
receive notice of Plaintiff's Motion For Sanctions and Judgment. 
(See Affidavit of Grant Orton, paragraph 3) 
2. The Motion To Set Aside Plaintiff's Judgment was filed 
within 90 days of the filing of the Judgment. 
3. Defendants had no notice of the Judgment until being 
served with the Supplemental Order. (See Affidavit of Clare 
Morse, paragraphs 7, 8, and 9) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., provide for relief 
from the entry of defaults and default judgments for good cause 
shown and for (b)(1), "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect". The applicable standard is stated as follows 
in Westinghouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. Larsen Contractor, 
Inc., 544 P. 2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch and 
to move calendars with expedition in order to keep them up-
to-date. But it is even more important to keep in mind that 
the very reason for the existence of courts is to afford 
disputants an opportunity to be heard and to do justice 
between them. In conformity with that principle, the courts 
generally tend to favor granting relief from default 
judgments where there is any reasonable excuse unless it 
will result in substantial prejudice or injustice ot the 
adverse party. 
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The facts established by the record now before the Court clearly 
satisfy the requirements of Rule 55(c) and 60(b) and compel the 
granting of the relief sought by Defendant's Motion. The failure 
of Defendants to file and serve a timely and appropriate response 
to the Motions for Sanctions and Judgment brought by the 
Plaintiff was caused by problems both with the mail (Orton nor 
Morse received the notices), and with Grant Orton serving 
military duty during the war in Kuwait during January - June 
1991. The failure was not the result of poor practices, 
carelessness, or lack of concern on the part of Defendants, but 
rather a problem with the mail in part caused by Defendant Orton 
being called up in the military during this period. Moreover, 
defendants have, hold and claim, and are fully prepared to 
assert, good and meritorious defenses to each of the claims and 
issues that are raised by and that are the subject of the 
Plaintiff's Complaint• 
ARGUMENT 
Although a litigant is often charged with his attorney's 
misconduct, the rule may not apply with equal force to default 
judgments. See 21 ALR3d 1255 and cases there cited. The courts 
have demonstrated their willingness to relieve innocent clients 
from the consequences of their attorney's negligence in certain 
circumstances by recognizing exceptions to the general rule. 
Such relief is often limited to extraordinary circumstances, 
such as where the attorney';s neglect is extreme, or counsel has 
actually abandoned his responsibilities. The utter failure of 
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representation in effect abolishes the attorney-client 
relationship. 64 ALR 4th 323, § 2, footnotes 19-20 and cases 
there cited. Since the application of one of the exceptions to 
the general rule usually involves questions of fact regarding the 
nature of counsel's conduct, the trial judge has great 
discretion. See Harris v. Tillev (197) 25 U.2d 260, 480 P2d 132, 
64 ALR4th 323 at § 20[b]. 
Even after trial, where it is determined that the lawyer 
utterly failed to provide adequate representation, and his 
client's substantive rights were adversely affected by palpable 
attorney malfeasance, a new trial has been allowed. Garrett v. 
Osborn, 164 Colo 31, 431 P2d 1012. If a client's rights have 
been wantonly or inadvertently jeopardized or lost by counsel, as 
in a complete failure to appear, the court may afford relief by 
granting a new trial in a civil case. Nordensson v. Nordensson 
(App) 146 Ariz 544, 707 P2d 948, later app 152 Ariz 438, 733 P2d 
635. A litigant who employs counsel and communicates the merit 
of the case may reasonably rely on that counsel, and counsel's 
negligence will not be imputed to the litigant without ample 
notice either of counsel's negligence or of the need for personal 
action. Thelen v. Thelen, 53 NC App 684, 281 SE2d 737. 
Utah allows relief for extreme misconduct by counsel. The 
following Utah cases have discussed incompetence of counsel as a 
ground for relief from a judgment: 
(a) In 1979 the Utah Court commented that alleged 
incompetence of counsel, based on differing theories and 
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assumptions, is not grounds for relief. In Maltbv v. Cox, (Utah 
1979) 598 P.2d 336 the Utah Supreme Court refused to reverse 
denial of a motion for a new trial based on allegedly incompetent 
trial counsel, because present counsel disagreed with the 
theories and assumptions of the former attorney who had tried an 
automobile accident case. The court said the plaintiff had now 
shown that the jury's verdict would have been different had the 
alternative theories been followed, and denied relief. 
In dicta in the Maltbv case, the main opinion by Justice 
Wilkins (Justice Maughn concurring) made the general comment that 
while incompetence of counsel in a criminal case might be grounds 
for a new trial, so far as they had determined the Utah Supreme 
Court had never granted relief on such grounds in a civil case. 
(b) Concurring opinion allows relief where process has gone 
awry in civil cases. Crockett's concurrence in Maltbv v. Coxf 
(Utah 1979) 598 P. 2d 336 (joined by Hall and Stewart, J.) 
objected to that broad language and commented as follows: 
At P. 341: 
The purpose of all court proceedings is, of course, to do 
justice. If the processes have so clearly gone awry that an 
injustice has resulted, the court in charge of the trial, or 
this Court on review, should rectify such an unfortunate 
occurrence, whether the proceeding is criminal or civil. 
(emphasis added). 
At P. 342: 
[I]ncompetence or negligence of counsel which appears to 
have resulted in an injustice will justify the granting of a 
new trial (citing Garrett v. Osborn, 164 Colo. 31, 431 P.2d 
1012 (1968). It is therefore my view that in determining 
whether relief should be granted the matter of critical 
concern should not be as to the nature of the proceeding, 
but whether there is such a strong likelihood that an 
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injustice had resulted (id. at 1013) that good conscience 
requires it to be remedied." (emphasis added). 
Judgment deprives Morse and Transamerica Equities of due 
process of law. Under the 5th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
and Art. I, § 7 of the Utah Constitution, he may not be deprived 
of property without "due process of law". 
Strong public policy favors hearing the case on the merits. 
If URCP 60(b)(1) excusable neglect standard were applicable (it 
is not) still Morse has met that standard. Some rules announced 
in cases that have discussed circumstance which justify relief 
from a default judgment include the following: 
(a) Liberal in granting of trial on merits. Courts should 
be liberal and somewhat indulgent in granting relief against 
judgments taken by default to end that controversies may be tried 
on merits. Mason v. Mason, 597 P.2d 1322 (Utah 1979); Baird v. 
Intermountain School Federal credit Union, 55 P.2d 877 (Utah 
1976); McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, Inc., 411 P.2d 
129, 17 U.2d 323 (1966); Pitts v. Pine Meadow Ranch, Inc., 589 
P.2d 767 (Utah 1978) 
(c) A 1982 medical malpractice case reaffirmed Justice 
Maugn's concurring opinion in Maltbv. In Jennings v. Stoker, 652 
P.2d 912 (Utah 1982), the Supreme Court refused to reverse a 
verdict based on alleged trial attorney incompetence because: (A) 
a motion for a new trial had not been filed, (B) mere differences 
in theory of trial techniques are not sufficient to grant a new 
trial, and (C) the plaintiff had failed to demonstrate that there 
was a reasonable likelihood that the verdict would have been 
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different. The court cited with approval 58 Am. Jur. 2d New 
Trial § 160 & 66 CJS New Trial § 82b, and cited with approval 
Justice Maugn's concurring opinion in Maltbv v. Cox, 598 P.2d 336 
[quoted in paragraph 24(b) above]. At page 913 the Utah Supreme 
Court commented in part as follows: 
"The general rule is that in civil cases a new trial will 
not be granted based upon the incompetence or negligence of 
one's own trial counsel. There are cases which recognize 
that under exigent or exceptional circumstances, 
the court may justify in granting a new trial. Maltby v. 
Cox, 598 P.2d 336, see the concurring opinion by Chief 
Justice Crockett which is concurred in by two other 
justices; 58 Am. Jur. 2d New Trial § 160 & 66 CJS New Trial 
§ 82b." (emphasis added) 
(d) Supreme Court reversed denial of motion to vacate 
default judgment entered as sanction for tardiness of attorney. 
In McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, 411 P.2d 129 (Utah 
1966), defendant's attorney was 27 minutes late for trial. The 
court scheduled trial on short notice, and counsel objected 
because witnesses were unavailable. The morning of trial counsel 
sought a writ of prohibition from the Supreme Court. 
Unsuccessful, he called the Court and advised what he was doing 
and that he would be late. Because of his absence the Court 
entered default of his client and proceeded to hear evidence. 
The trial court refused to permit the attorney after he arrived 
late) to participate meaningfully in those proceedings, and 
entered a default judgment. New counsel moved to vacate that 
default, which was denied by the trial court. The Supreme Court 
reversed and in part stated as follows: 
It is policy of law to favor trial on merits and to afford 
both sides full opportunity to present their evidence and 
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contentions as to disputed issues so they may be disposed of 
on substantial rather than upon technical grounds. 
(emphasis added). 
Courts should exercise caution in regard to default 
judgments and should be somewhat indulgent if setting such 
judgments aside. (emphasis added). 
"In order to achieve the objectives just stated it is 
sometimes necessary to look beyond what appear to be ill-
advised, or even irritating or contemptuous conduct of 
counsel to the adjudication of the rights of the parties to 
the action. It should be kept in mind that their rights and 
any such misconduct of counsel are separate and distinct 
things which should be dealt with separately.11 The purpose 
of a default judgment is to conclude litigation when 
defendant fails to plead or otherwise defend an action. • . 
it was never intended to be used as a means of disciplining 
attorneys who may be derelict in the performance of their 
duties. If such a course were followed it may do a grave 
injustice to the client by punishing him rather than the 
attorney who has done the wrong." (emphasis added). 
At p. 131 the Court stated, "We are acquainted with no 
foundation in law, either statutory or decisional, which 
would justify the entering of a default judgment and 
preventing the defendants from participating in a trial 
under circumstances shown here." (Court cited Hovey v. 
Elliott, et al. 167 US 490, 17 S Ct 8412, 43 LEd 215 and 14 
ALR2d 580, et seq. re impropriety of striking pleading and 
entering default to punish contempt). (emphasis added). 
(See discussion in paragraph 23(a) above)• 
The sanction of a default judgment should not be imposed 
upon Morse and Transamerica Equities because of misfeasance of 
his attorney if such might be found. As noted by the Court in 
McKean v. Mountain View Memorial Estates, supra, where defendants 
have raised issues by their pleading, they should not be punished 
by suffering a default judgment as a result of misconduct of 
their attorney. 
Reasonable excuse. It is generally an abuse of discretion 
to refuse to vacate judgment where there is reasonable 
justification or excuse and timely application is made to set it 
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aside. See Central Finance Co. v. Kynaston, 22 U. 2d 284, 452 P. 
2d 316; Board of Education of Granite School Dist. v. Cox, 384 
P.2d 806, 14 U.2d 385 (Utah 1963). The Court should be indulgent 
toward permitting full inquiry and knowledge of disputes so they 
can be resolved in conformity with law and justice. See Mavhew 
v. Standard Gilsonite, 376 P.2d 951, 14 U. 2d 52; Social Service 
v. Musselman# 667 P.2d 951, 14 U. 2d 52; Social Service v. 
Musselman, 667 P.2d 1053. 
Policy favors trial on merits. The law tends to accord to 
litigants the chance for a hearing on the merits where it can be 
done without serious injustice to the other party. Courts are 
generally indulgent toward setting aside default judgments if 
there is reasonable justification or excuse and timely 
application is made. See Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla 
Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369 (Utah 1980); 
Doubt should be resolved in favor of vacating judgment. If 
there it is unclear whether a default should be set aside, the 
law favors doing so. Interstate Excavating, Inc. v. Agla 
Development Corp., 611 P.2d 369. 
Under the circumstances in this situation before the Court, 
the Judgment should be set aside. 
Defendants' attorney Grant Orton, had been called up on 
military duty for certain periods of time during the Gulf War 
Crisis. He established certain criteria to oversee his legal 
responsibilities during that period of time. His secretary was 
to pick up the mail or the post office was to hold his mail. He 
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would periodically check his mail and take care of the problems 
shown there. Nothing came to him in the mail in reference to the 
motions for sanctions and motions for judgment. He thought 
everything was taken care of. 
And so it was with considerable surprise that he found his 
client had been served with a Supplemental Order upon a Judgment 
that he had no knowledge of. He tried to take care of the client 
by filing a Motion To Set Aside was again activated by the 
military and therefore requested new counsel to file the Motion 
and to pursue the Setting Aside Of The Judgment. This was done 
in a timely fashion but was denied by the District Court. 
Conclusion 
Justice clearly calls for a reversal of the lower court's 
denial or Defendants' Motion To Set Aside Its Judgment. Based 
upon rule 55 and 60(b) the District Court should be instructed to 
set aside the Order For Sanctions And Judgment and allow the case 
to be set for trial. 
Respectfully so requested this 9th day/of March, 19#2 
WESLEY F. SII 
Attorney at Law 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 9th day of March, I hand 
delivered a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to the following: 
J. Bruce Reading 
Marlon L. Bates 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite f200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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EXHIBIT I 
FILED 
OlS'lP.'.OT COURT 
JAN IB 3 5^ PH.'91 
THIRD JUDiCiAL CiSTHlCT 
C A I T l AKP .-.aiJKTY 
, #4794* ^ 0 E P 7TY CLERK ^ ^ X l / ^ ^ F ^ ^ V 
COUNTY. UTAH 
J. BRUCE READING 
MARLON L. BATES 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
UPON 
SANDY PHECJtlCI.SAJ 
DEPUTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
-TRANSAMERIGA EQUITIES, INC.* 
Defendants. 
SUMMONS 
(Twenty Day) 
Civil No. g lO")C>OO(flCJ0 
Judge W<7fa 5C^ I 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANT, TRANSAMERICA 
EQUITIES, INC.: 
You are hereby summoned and required to file an answer in 
writing to the attached complaint with the clerk of the above-
entitled District Court, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84111 and to serve upon, or mail to Marlon L. Bates of Scalley & 
Reading, plaintiff's attorney, 261 East 300 South, Suite 200, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said answer, within twenty (20) 
days after service of this summons upon you. 
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken 
against you for relief demanded in said complaint, which has been 
C:\MLB\PLEADING\MORSE2.SUM 
(J*^ f. Arf-M^ i^- iA- ' iff H0O Co //Y00 £ 
filed with the Clerk of the Court and a copy of which is hereto 
annexed and herewith served upon you. 
DATED this day of January, 1991. 
Marloji L. Bates 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Serve Defendant: 
Transamerica Equities, Inc. 
c/o Clare T. Morse, President and Registered Agent 
6292 South 320 West #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
C:\MLB\PLEADING\M0RSE2.SUM 2 
J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff, Kendrick Brothers Construction, Inc. 
(hereinafter "Kendrick"), for cause of action against defendants, 
Clare T. Morse (hereinafter "Morse") and Transamerica Equities, 
Inc. (hereinafter "TEI"), asserts as follows: 
GENERAL ALLEGATIONS 
1. Kendrick is a Utah corporation with principal 
offices located in Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
2. Morse is an individual who upon information and 
belief is a resident of Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
COMPLAINT 
Civil No. *[ i n^ooaC-JhCk) 
Judge \k/'Aicif\<>or\ 
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3* TEI, upon information and belief, is a Utah 
corporation with principal offices located in Salt Lake County, 
state of Utah. 
4. The activities upon which this action is based 
occurred in Salt Lake County, state of Utah. 
5. On or about April 18, 1990, TEI and Morse entered 
into a joint venture agreement (hereinafter "the Agreement") with 
Kendrick wherein Kendrick would pay a Fifty Thousand and No/100 
Dollar ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee to obtain financing for the 
purchase and improvement of certain commercial real property 
located in Salt Lake County, state of Utah (hereinafter "the 
Venture"). A copy of the Agreement is attached hereto as "Exhibit 
A" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
6. In order to induce Kendrick to enter into the 
Agreement and provide the Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollar 
($50,000.00) loan commitment fee, TEI and Morse provided Kendrick 
with a loan commitment letter (hereinafter the "Loan Commitment") 
from John L. Gordin (hereinafter "Gordin") of Commercial Property 
Mortgage Corporation (hereinafter "CPMC") wherein Gordin had 
approved financing in the amount of Two Million Five Hundred 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($2,500,000.00), conditioned upon 
receipt of the loan commitment fee and other conditions enumerated 
within the Loan Commitment. A copy of the Loan Commitment is 
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attached hereto as "Exhibit B" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
7c Kendrick confirmed with both Morse and Gordin that 
all conditions precedent to fulfilling the obligation to provide 
the financing had been fulfilled except the receipt of the Fifty 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee. 
8. On April 19, 1990, Kendrick wired the sum of Fifty 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) into the account of CPMC 
in reliance upon the representations of Morse and Gordin that 
funding for the Venture was approved. A copy of the wire 
confirmation is attached hereto as "Exhibit CM and incorporated 
herein by this reference. 
9. Notwithstanding Gordin and CPMC's promise to provide 
funding in the amount of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($2,500,000.00) for the Venture, no financing has 
ever been provided. 
10* On numerous occasions from April to the present 
time, Kendrick attempted to contact Morse and TEI to find out why 
the financing had not been provided. Morse and TEI refused to 
discuss the matter with Kendrick and refused to return its repeated 
phone calls. 
11. In an effort to recover its Fifty Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee, Kendrick retained 
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counsel in California to file an action against Gordin and CPMC. 
A copy of the Complaint, Application for Prejudgment Writ of 
Attachment, and Declaration of Tom Kendrick, Sr. are attached 
hereto as "Exhibit D," "Exhibit E," and "Exhibit F" respectively 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
12. In response to the documents filed by Kendrick, the 
Court ruled that the Loan Commitment was an agreement between CPMC 
and Morse and that Kendrick was not in privity of contract with 
CPMC and was not, therefore, the proper party to sue CPMC. 
13. When Kendrick learned that the California court 
would not allow Kendrick to proceed against CPMC for a return of 
Kendrickfs loan commitment fee, Kendrick once again attempted to 
solicit Morse's and TEIfs support to enforce the Loan Commitment or 
receive a return of the fee paid. Once again, Morse and TEI 
refused to respond in any manner to assist Kendrick despite 
repeated telephone calls. 
14. On September 18, 1990, Kendrickfs Utah counsel, 
Marlon L. Bates, contacted Morse's attorney, Grant L. Orton, to 
request that Morse and TEI send a letter to CPMC and Gordin 
demanding that the Venture either be funded or the commitment fee 
refunded. Mr. Orton was reminded of the fact that the Loan 
Commitment was scheduled to expire on October 18, 1990, and that if 
any additional documents were being requested by Gordin or CPMC, 
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they would have to be provided before that date or the commitment 
fee could become non-refundable. Mr. Orton agreed to send a letter 
to Gordin's and CPMCfs attorney. Mr. Bates transmitted to Mr. 
Orton a copy of what he believed the letter should say together 
with a letter summarizing the contents of the telephone call. A 
copy of the letter to Mr. Orton and the sample letter to be sent to 
Gordin's and CPMC's attorney are attached hereto as "Exhibit GH and 
"Exhibit H" respectfully and are incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
15. From September 24, 1990 through November 29, 1990, 
a series of letters were sent among Kendrickfs counsel, Morse's 
counsel, and CPMC's counsel which collectively illustrate that 
Kendrick did everything possible to solicit the assistance of Morse 
and TEI (who were in privity of contract with CPMC) to join 
Kendrick in persuading CPMC to refund the Fifty Thousand and No/100 
Dollars ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee or finance the Venture as 
promised: 
a. Letter dated September 24, 1990, from 
Kendrickfs counsel to Morse's counsel requesting that the letter 
promised on September 18 be sent out immediately because the 
October 18, 1990 expiration date of the Loan Commitment was drawing 
closer. A copy of such letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit I" 
and incorporated herein by this reference. 
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b. Letter dated September 25, 1990, from 
Kendrick's counsel to Morse's counsel requesting once again that 
the letter be sent immediately. A copy of such letter is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit JH and incorporated herein by this reference. 
c. Letter dated October 1, 1990, from Kendrick's 
counsel to Gordin's and CPMC's counsel in California demanding 
information regarding what, if anything, was preventing the funding 
of the Venture or demanding a return of the loan commitment fee. 
A copy of such letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit K," and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
d. Letter dated October 1, 1990 from Morse's 
counsel to CPMC's counsel in California requesting information as 
to why the Venture had not been financed as promised. (Kendrick's 
counsel did not receive a copy of this letter until one week after 
it was sent.) A copy of such letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit 
L" and incorporated herein by this reference. 
e. Letter dated October 4, 1990, from Kendrick's 
counsel to Morse's counsel demanding once again that the letter 
promised on September 18 be sent out immediately in order to meet 
the October 18, 1990 expiration date of the Loan Commitment. A 
copy of such letter is attached hereto as "Exhibit M" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
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f. Letter dated October 5, 1990, from Morse's 
counsel to Kendrick's counsel explaining that he did send out the 
promised letter on October 1, 1990 and enclosing a copy of the 
October 1, 1990 letter for Kendrick's counsel. 
g. Letter dated October 12, 1990, from Gordin's 
and CPMC's counsel in California to Kendrick's counsel stating that 
additional information was necessary to conclude the financing of 
the Venture and that such information had already been requested of 
Morse, who was CPMC's customer. The letter further refused to 
refund the loan commitment fee and made reference to a letter dated 
September 4, 1990 from CPMC's counsel to Kendrick's California 
counsel which stated that Kendrick had nothing to do with the 
financing of the Venture because CPMC's Loan Commitment was to 
Morse and TEI and not to Kendrick. A copy of the October 12, 1990 
letter is attached as "Exhibit 0H and incorporated herein by this 
reference. A copy of the September 4, 1990 letter is attached 
hereto as "Exhibit PH and incorporated herein by this reference. 
h. Letter dated October 16, 1990 from Kendrick's 
counsel to Morse's counsel transmitting copies of the two letters 
sent by Gordin's and CPMC's counsel and requesting verification of 
the statement that CPMC had, indeed, previously requested 
additional information from Morse in order to finance the Venture. 
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A copy of such letter is attached hereto as MExhibit Q" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
i. Letter dated November 29, 1990, from Kendrickf s 
counsel to Morse's counsel referencing a telephone conversation 
between the two attorneys three weeks before in which Morse's 
attorney confirmed that Morse had received a letter from CPMC 
requesting additional information in order to finance the Venture 
and promised to transmit the letter to Kendrick's counsel upon 
receipt of the letter from Morse. A copy of such letter is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit R" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
16. In addition to the correspondence described above, 
Morse's attorney disclosed to Kendrick*s attorney in a telephone 
conversation on November 1, 1990, that Morse and CPMC were working 
together on a second project which Gordin and CPMC had also 
promised to finance. According to Morse's attorney, Morse would do 
nothing to help Kendrick either recover its commitment fee or force 
CPMC to finance the Venture until the second project which Morse 
had with CPMC was fully funded. Morse's attorney stated that he 
did not know how long it would take to conclude the second 
transaction between Morse and CPMC. 
17. As of the date of this Complaint, Morse and TEI: (i) 
have not provided Kendrick with information regarding what CPMC has 
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requested in order to finance the Venture although Morse has had 
that information for quite some time now, (ii) have not indicated 
whether such information has been provided to CPMC, and (iii) have 
not informed Kendrick about when Morse's second project with CPMC 
would be completely funded, and (iv) have not told Kendrick why the 
Venture was subordinated to the second project between Morse and 
CPMC* Additionally, Morse has declined Kendrick1s request to join 
Kendrick in an action against CPMC to force the promised financing 
or to refund the commitment fee even though Kendrick has promised 
to pay all attorney's fees associated therewith. Indeed, with the 
sole exception of one letter sent by Morse's counsel to CPMC's 
attorney after repeated demands by Kendrickfs counsel, Morse and 
TEI have done nothing to support Kendrick's efforts to conclude the 
financing for the Venture or receive a refund of its Fifty Thousand 
and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) commitment fee even though Morse 
and TEI were aware of the damages their inaction would cause 
Kendrick. 
COUNT I (Breach of Fiduciary Duty) 
18. Kendrick incorporates herein by this reference all 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1-17 above. 
19. Morse and TEI have materially breached their 
fiduciary duty to their joint venturer, Kendrick, by failing to 
exercise loyalty to the joint concern and by failing to show the 
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utmost good faith, fairness, and honesty in their dealing with 
Kendrick. 
20. Morse and TEI have failed to follow through on 
efforts to conclude the financing, have refused to assist Kendrick 
in bringing an action against CPMC for wrongfully failing to 
finance the Venture or return the commitment fee, and have placed 
the interests of a second transaction with CPMC above the interests 
of the joint venture, to the detriment of the joint venture. 
21. As a direct and proximate result of this breach of 
fiduciary duty, Kendrick has incurred damages in the amount of 
Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00), plus profits lost 
on the joint venture in an amount to be established upon the 
evidence at trial. 
COUNT II (Breach of Implied Covenant 
of Good Faith and Fair Dealing) 
22. Kendrick incorporates herein by this reference all 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1-21 above. 
23. Morse and TEI have materially breached their implied 
covenant to Kendrick of good faith and fair dealing by failing to 
assist Kendrick in completing the financing for the Venture or 
receiving a refund of its commitment fee, and by placing the 
interests of a second transaction with CPMC above the interest of 
the joint venture to the detriment of the joint venture. 
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24. As a direct and proximate result of this breach of 
an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, Kendrick has 
incurred damages in the amount of Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($50,000.00), plus profits lost on the joint venture in an amount 
to be established upon the evidence at trial. 
COUNT III (Negligence) 
25. Kendrick incorporates herein by this reference all 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1-24 above. 
26. Morse and TEI had a duty to use reasonable care to 
provide all information required by CPMC in a timely manner in 
order to facilitate the funding of the Venture. 
27. Morse and TEI materially breached their duty by 
failing to provide in a timely manner information requested by CPMC 
to conclude the financing of the Venture. 
28. As a direct and proximate result of the failure of 
Morse and TEI to fulfill their duty to provide said information, 
Kendrick has been damaged in the amount of Fifty Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00), plus profits lost in the joint venture 
in an amount to be established upon the information. 
COUNT IV (Fraud) 
29. Kendrick incorporates herein by this reference all 
allegations contained in paragraphs 1-28 above. 
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30. Morse and TEI fraudulently conspired with Gordin and 
CPMC to withhold their support of Kendrick?s efforts to protect the 
interests of the joint venture in exchange for Gordinfs and CPMC's 
efforts to finance a second transaction on behalf of Morse and TEI. 
31. As a direct and proximate result of this fraudulent 
activity, Kendrick has been damaged in the amount of Fifty Thousand 
and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00), plus profits lost on the joint 
venture in an amount to be established upon the evidence at trial. 
WHEREFORE, Kendrick prays for relief as follows: 
1. As to COUNT I, COUNT II, and COUNT III, Kendrick 
prays for judgment against defendants in the amount of Fifty 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00), together with lost 
profits of the joint venture in an amount to be established upon 
the evidence at trial, prejudgment interest at the legal rate, 
court costs, and attorney's fees incurred herein. 
2. As to COUNT IV, Kendrick prays for judgment against 
defendants in the amount of Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars 
($50,000.00), together with lost profits of the joint venture in an 
amount to be established upon evidence at trial, punitive damages, 
prejudgment interest at the legal rate, court costs, and attorney's 
fees incurred herein. 
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3. For such other and further relief as this Court 
deems just and equitable in the premises. 
DATED this lf/{ day of January, 1991. 
SCALLEY & READING 
Plaintiff's Address: 
4015 South 300 West 
Murray, Utah 84107 
MarK 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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EXHIBIT I I 
Grant G Orton #2482 
Attorney for Defendants 
2670 Soutn 2000 East 
8ait Lake City, Utan &4109 
Teiepnone: (aOl) 465-7S37 
IN TMK THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATK OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHEKS CONSTRUCTION J 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
CLARE T. HORSE and 
TKANSAHERXCA EQUITIES, INC. ] 
Defendants. ) 
A N S 
Civil 
) J u d g e 
W E R 
No. 91090006SCN 
Homer Wilkinson 
COME NOW defendants, by and through their attorney, Grant G 
Orton, ana in response to the allegations of plaintiff8s complaint 
answer, aver and allege as follows: 
1. Plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim against these 
defendants, individually and collectively, upon which relief can be 
granted. 
2. Defendants admit tne allegations of paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 
5, 9, 11, 12, 15 and 2b of plaintiff's complaint. 
2. Defendants admit that defendant Transamerica Equities, 
Inc. provided KendricK with a copy of a loan commitment letter from 
Commercial Property Mortgage Corporation wherein CPMC approved 
financing in the amount of Two Million Five Hundred Thousand and 
No/iOo Dollars ($2,5o0,oo0.0o), conditioned upon receipt of the 
loan commitment fee and other conditions enumerated within the Loan 
commitment; allege tnat said copy was given to plaintiff at its 
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request and nor in an attempt to induce plaintiff to provide any 
funds to defendants or either of them, and deny each and every 
other allegation of paragraph 6 of plaintiff's complaint. 
3. Defendants deny that plaintiff confirmed with Morse 
tnat all conditions precedent to fulfilling the obligation to 
provide the financing nad been fulfilled except the receipt of the 
Fifty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) loan commitment fee; 
ana are without sufficient information or knowledge to form a 
Deiier as to the truth or falsity of the balance of the allegations 
of paragraph 7 of plaintiff's complaint and therefore deny the 
same. 
4. Defendants allege that plaintiff represented to each of 
them that plaintiff had wired the sum of Fifty Thousand and No/100 
Dollars into the account of CPMC; have no independant knowledge 
that this did in fact occur; submit that Exhibit "C" of plaintiff's 
complaint does not show the owner of the account into which 
plaintiff's funds are alleged to have been transferred; but assume 
tnat said sum was transferred to CPMC by its subsequent actions, 
and therefore admit the allegations of paragraph 8 of plaintiff's 
complaint. 
5. Defendants admit that on numerous occasions from April to 
the present time, Kendrick attempted to contact Morse and TEI to 
find out why the financing had not been provided, but allege that 
Morse, on behalf of TEI as its President, returned calls on 
numerous occasions when he was told of calls being made by 
plaintiff, and therefore deny the balance of the allegations of 
paragraph 10 of plaintiff*s complaint inconsistent herewith. 
6. Detenaants allege that after Kendrick notified them that 
the California court haa dismissed plaintiff's case against CPMC, 
plaintiff attempted to solicit Morse's and TEI's support to enforce 
the Loan Commitment or receive a return of the fee paid, that, 
Morse, as President of TEI, spoke to CPMC about the matter on 
several occasions and authorized corporate counsel to communicate 
tne corporation's concerns to CPMC, that to this date CPMC has 
advised TEI that it is proceeding with the financing package for 
tne proDect, that items may still be required which are unknown at 
the present time due to the unavailability of certain documents 
oecause of the takeover of the owner of the project by the RTC, and 
tne lack of cooperation of the RTC's predecessor in interest; and 
deny ail allegations of paragraph 13 of plaintiff's complaint 
inconsistent herewith. 
7c Defendants admit that on September 18, 1990, Kendrick's 
Utah Counsel, Marlon L. Bates, contacted Morse's attorney, Grant G 
urton, to request that Morse and TEI send a letter to CPMC and 
Gordin demanding that the Venture either be funded or the 
commitment fee refunded; and that Mr. Orton was told that the loan 
Commitment was scheduled to expire on October 18, 1990, and that if 
any aaaitional documents were being requested by Gordin or CPMC, 
they would have to be provided before that date or the commitment 
fee could become non-refundable; allege that Mr. Orton could not 
send any such letter to Gordin and CPMC's attorney without an 
autnorization to do so; allege that the sample letter which 
plaintiff proposed to send is immaterial and has no bearing on tnis 
matter at all, oecause such a letter in any event would have to 
approved by TEI, but do admit that copies of Exhibit "G" and 
Exhioit "H" were sent to defendants' counsel; and deny all other 
allegations of paragraph 14 inconsistent herewith. 
8. Defendants admit that defendants' attorney disclosed to 
Kendrick's attorney in a telephone conversation on November 1, 
1^90, that Morse and CPMC were working together on a another 
project which CPMC had also promised to finance. Defendants deny 
that defendants' attorney said that Morse would do nothing to help 
KendricK either recover its commitment fee or force CPMC to finance 
the Venture until the second project which Morse had with CPMC was 
fully funded; but allege that Morse's attorney rather indicated to 
plaintiff's attorney that it was his understanding that CPMC would 
not rinance the subject project until the first project was done, 
and that Morse's attorney did not know how long it would take to 
conclude the first transaction which was brokered by Morse to CPMC; 
and deny all other allegations of paragraph 16 inconsistent 
herewith. 
*. Defendants admit that Morse has declined Kendrick's 
request to join Kendrick in an action against CPMC to force the 
promised financing or to refund the commitment fee; allege that 
Morse, as President of TEI, is convinced that it is CPMCs intent 
to fund the project, and that to file such a suit at this time 
could jeopardize the funding of the project because TEI has been 
intormed by CPMC that estoppel letters from tenants are required, 
wnich TEI has been unable to obtain from the present fee owner, and 
nas oeen forced to file a suit in federal court to force the sale 
or tne project and to provide necessary documents to complete the 
tunamg; and furthermore allege that plaintiff has been told of 
cms prooiem; allege tnat rhe financing on rhe other project which 
was broKered oy worse, has nothing to do with this matter, otner 
man the tact that as a matter of funding priority it is TEI's 
understanding that said project will be funded before the suo^ect 
project, and therefore that no information on said project has been 
provided to plaintitt, ano deny all other allegations of 
plamtirf's paragraph 17 inconsistent herewith, 
10. Derendants deny the allegations of paragraphs 19, 21, 23, 
24, 27, 2a and 30 of plaintiff's complaint. 
11. in response to paragraphs 18, 22, 25 and 29 of 
piamtirr's complaint, defendants hereoy incorporate by reference 
their responses to all other allegations of plaintiff contained 
herein. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES 
12. At all times pursuant hereto, defendant, Clare T. Morse 
("Morse"), was an officer in defendant corporation, Transamerxca 
Equities, Inc., was acting solely for said corporation, and is not 
personally liaole for the acts of the said corporation. 
13. There is no contractural relationship between plaintiff 
and defendant, Clare T. Morse. 
14. The copy of the subject Doint venture agreement, attached 
to plaintiff's complaint as Exhibit "A", is not a true and correct 
copy in tnat tne original document bears interlineations on page 1 
eliminating all references to Clare T. Morse. 
15. fiamtitt's complaint fails to name an mdespensible 
party, i.e. Commercial Property Mortgage Corporation. 
WHEREFORE, these defendants pray for dismissal of this action 
togetner with costs and attorneys1 fees necessarily incurred in 
their defense, and for sucn other and further relief as the court 
may deem just and proper• 
DATED this 11th day of J 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
i certity tnat I aid send a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing ANSWER, postage prepaia, to plaintiff's attorneys, J. 
Bruce Reading ana Marlon L. Bates at SCALLEY £ READING, 261 East 
JUU soutn, suite 200; Salt Lake City, Utah/84111 this * J *day of 
January, ld9I. 
Attorney for Defendants 
EXHIBIT I I I 
J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION : MOTION TO STRIKE ANSWER AND 
COMPANY, INC., AWARD DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND 
ATTORNEY'S FEES" 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
CLARE T. MORSE and Civil NO.910900069CN 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
COMES now the plaintiff, by and through counsel, and 
moves this Court for an order striking defendants' answer and 
awarding default judgment as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint, 
together with attorney's fees incurred in bringing the Motion to 
Compel and this Motion to Strike. This motion is brought in 
accordance with Rule 37(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and 
based upon the defendants' failure to produce discovery within 15 
days of the Court's minute entry dated April 5, 1991. This motion 
is supported by the accompanying Memorandum of Points and 
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Authorities and the Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates, counsel for the 
plaintiff. 
DATED this cS day of April, 1991. 
SCALLEY & READING 
tfaflbn L, B a t e s \ J 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the j^j day of April, 1991, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Motion to Strike Answer and Award Default Judgment and Attorney's 
Fees to the following: 
Grant G. Orton, Esq. 
2670 South 2000 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
JJjtyinifclcuMdl 
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EXHIBIT IV 
WESLEY F. SINE (2967) 
Attorney for Defendants 
349 South 200 East, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-i>125 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS TRANSAMERICA 
EQUITIES AND CLARE T. MORSE'S 
MOTION TO SET ASIDE SANCTIONS 
AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No.: 9109.0069CN 
JUDGE: WILKINSON 
DEFENDANTS Transamerica Equities, Inc. and Clare T. Morse 
nereby move the Court pursuant to rules 55(c) and 60(b) Utah 
R. Civ. P., to set aside the Judgment Certificate and Sanctions 
in favor of Plaintiff against Transamerica Equities, Inc. 
and filed the 3rd day of June, 1991. 
The grounds for this Motion and the facts support the 
same are more particularly set forth in the Affidavits and 
Memorandum in support hereof that are filed herewith. 
DATED this 23rd day of August, 1991. 
WESLEY F. 
Attorney for Defendants 
EXHIBIT V 
WESLEY t\ SINE [Z3*>1) 
Attorney tor Defendants 
34y South ZVQ East, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 64111 
Telephone: (801) Jb4-b12b 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Flaintitf, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT 
Civil NO.: yioyuOObyCN -
JUDGE: WILKINSON 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Memorandum is submitted to the provision of Rule 
4-501, Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, in support 
of Defendants Grant G. Orton and Clare T. Morse's Motion 
To Set Aside Judgment and Sanctions filed by Plaintiff and 
served herewith. 
II. STATEMENT OF" MATERIAL FACTS^ 
The record now before the court establishes the following 
facts that are material to Plaintiff's Motion: 
1. In response to service of the Summons and Complaint 
in the above matter upon the defendants Transamerica Equities 
Inc. and Clare T. Morse, an answer was filed and served by 
mail on behalf of Transamerica Equities, Inc. and Clare T. 
Morse on or about January 11 , 1991. 
2. On July 10, 1991 Clare T. Morse and Transamerica 
Equities, Inc. learned for the first time that a Judgment 
had been obtained against Transamerica Equities, Inc. and 
Clare T. Morse in the instant matter when they were personally 
served by constable with a Motion and Order in Supplemental 
Proceedings. 
3. Their attorney, Grant Orton was out of town on a 
military call up. Upon reviewing the files and inquiring 
into this matter with Grant Orton, it was found that he had 
never received notice of plaintiff's judgment nor of the 
Motion apparently filed preliminary to the granting of 
judgment. 
4. The mail to Grant Orton1s office is delivered to 
a mail box in front of the building where his office is 
located. During the months of January through May 1991, 
Grant Orton had numerous military assignments outside of 
the State of Utah, and during that time the mail has been 
retained on occasion by the Postal Service when his part-
time secretary has not picked it up in a timely fashion. 
5. In the past when, this happened, it has been retained 
by the post office for it to be picked up there.' Upon 
checking with the post office Grant Orton: found:that this 
was not the case since there is no such mail retained by 
the Postal Service* 
6. Had Grant Orton become aware from any source that 
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a Motion preliminary to the granting of judgment and sanctions 
had been served in any manner, including by mail, he would 
have taken the action necessary to timely prepare, file and 
serve an appropriate response thereto and he would not have 
permitted or suffered any judgment or sanctions to have been 
entered against the Defendant herein, without his answering 
said motions* 
7. Defendants have, hold and claim valid and 
meritorious defenses to each of the claims and issues that 
are raised in and that are the subject of the Complaint and 
has asserted them in his Answer. 
8. Defendants Transamerica Equities, Inc. nor Clare 
T. Morse did not receive notice of the Motion for Sanctions 
and Judgment. 
9. Defendants did not receive Notice of Plaintiffs' 
Motions nor could they find those notices. 
10. That Grant Orton was attorney for Defendant Clare 
T. Morse and Transamerica Equities, Inc. and all defenses 
for Transamerica Equities included Morse. 
11o That Clare Morse did not receive notice of any 
of Plaintiff's notices. 
12. Defendants Clare T. Morse and Transamerica Equities 
did not have notice of any of the lack of response and 
therefore were dependent upon their attorney to represent 
them in this matter. 
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13. That at the very most, this was caused by excusable 
neglect. 
III. ARGUMENT 
Rules 55(c) and 60(b), Utah R. Civ. P., provide for 
relief from the entry of defaults and default judgments "for 
good cause shown" and for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, 
or excusable neglect". The applicable standard is stated 
as follows in Westinqhouse Electric Supply Co. v. Paul W. 
Larsen Contractor, Inc., 544 P. 2d 876, 879 (Utah 1975) 
It is indeed commendable to handle cases with dispatch 
and to move calendars with expedition in order to keep 
them up-to-date. But- it is even more important to keep 
in mind that the very reason for the existence of courts 
is to afford disputants an opportunity to be heard and 
to do justice between them. In conformity with that 
principle, the courts generally tend to favor granting 
relief from default judgments where there is any reason-
able excuse unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.-
The facts established by the record now before the Court 
clearly satisfy the requirements of Rule 55(c) and 60(b) and 
compel the granting of the relief sought by Defendant's Motion. 
The failure of Defendants to file and serve a timely and 
appropriate response to the Motions for Sanctions and Judgment 
Drought by the Plaintiff was caused by problems both with 
the mail (Orton nor Morse received the notices), and with 
Grant Orton serving military duty during the war in Kuwaitt 
during January - May 1991. The failure was not the result 
of poor practices, carelessness, or lack of concern on the 
part of Defendants, but rather a problem with the mail in 
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part caused by Defendant Orton being called up in the military 
during this period. Moreover, defendants have, hold and claim, 
and are fully prepared to assert, good and meritorious defenses 
to each of the claims and issues that are raised by and that 
are the subject of the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
IV* CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above Defendant's Motion should 
be granted* 
DATED this 3 / ^ d a y of August, 1991. 
'frfiSLEY F. SINE/ 
Attorney for Defendants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO SET ASIDE DEFAULT AND DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT was served upon the following named individuals by 
mailing a copy thereof to said individuals, postage pre-paid, 
at the address shown below: 
J. Bruce Reading, 
Marlon L. Bates, 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah-84111 
Savantha Lane 
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EXHIBIT VI 
J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION : OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET 
COMPANY, INC., ASIDE SANCTIONS AND JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
CLARE T. MORSE and Civil No.910900069CN 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Court properly responded to the defendants' long 
history of complete disregard for this case by striking defendants' 
answer and entering judgment against defendants. Now, over seven 
months after defendants abandoned this matter, they believe they 
have the right to start over again by setting aside the judgment 
which was properly entered. 
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
A chronology of material facts in this case establishes 
an inexcusable pattern of total neglect: 
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1. On January 18, 1991, plaintiff's attorney sent a 
Request for Production of Documents to Grant G. Orton, the attorney 
for defendants. The mailing certificate indicates that the 
document was properly mailed to the address which Mr. Orton uses 
for his practice of law. The document was not returned by the post 
office. 
2. On February 22, 1991, plaintiff's attorney sent Mr. 
Orton a letter reminding him that the time to answer the Request 
for Production of Documents had now passed and granting Mr. Orton 
an extension of time until March 1, 1991 to respond to the Request. 
Mr. Orton was duly advised that if he failed to respond on or 
before March 1, 1991, a motion to compel would be brought and 
sanctions would be requested. The letter was correctly mailed to 
Mr. Ortonfs business address- and was not'returned by tha- post 
office. A copy of the letter is attached as "Exhibit A" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. 
3. On March 5, 1991, plaintiff's attorney filed a 
Motion to Compel Production of Documents and asked the Court to 
award attorney's fees associated with bringing the motion because 
of defendants complete lack of response. This motion was also duly 
mailed to defendants' counsel and was not returned by the post 
office. 
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4. On April 1, 1991, plaintiff's attorney filed with 
the Court and duly mailed to defendants' attorney a Notice to 
Submit for Decision« This document was also not returned by the 
post office. 
5. On April 5, 1991, the Court granted plaintiff's 
motion and ordered defendants to respond to the Request for 
Production of Documents within fifteen (15) days of April 5, 1991. 
The Court held in reserve the issue of awarding attorney's fees. 
The Court's Minute Entry was duly mailed to defendants' attorney at 
the same address to which plaintiff's attorney had been sending 
correspondence. 
6. On April 18, 1991, Mr. Orton telephoned plaintiff's 
counsel to apologize for neglecting the matter. Mr. Orton 
acknowledged that he recei^ed-the--Court*s Minute.-Entry—and—the 
previous documents but had been too busy to get with Mr. Morse. 
Mr. Orton said that he told Mr. Morse about the Request for 
Production of Documents but he did not think Mr. Morse had done 
anything yet to assemble documents. Mr. Orton then requested 
additional time and plaintiff's attorney denied the request, 
reminding Mr. Orton that he already been given three months to 
respond. Finally, Mr. Orton said that he could not locate the 
Request for Production of Documents and asked if plaintiff's 
attorney would send him a new set. Plaintiff's attorney offered to 
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fax the document to Mr. Or ton so that he could have it immediately. 
As soon as the telephone conversation ended, plaintiff's counsel 
faxed the Request for Production of Documents to Mr. Orton. A copy 
of the fax transmittal sheet is attached hereto as "Exhibit B" and 
incorporated herein by this reference. A copy of the April client 
billing which further proves that Mr. Morse spoke directly with 
plaintiff's attorney and was denied any extension of time is 
attached hereto as "Exhibit C" and incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
7. On April 23, 1991, plaintiff's attorney filed a 
Motion to Strike Answer, Enter Default Judgment and Award 
Attorney's Fees because of defendants' failure to respond in any 
manner within the time period ordered by the Court. A copy of this 
motion was duly mailed to Mr. Orton and was not returned by the 
post office. 
8. On May 7, 1991, plaintiff's attorney filed a Notice 
to Submit and duly mailed a copy to Mr. Orton. The mailing was not 
returned by the post office. 
9. On May 21, 1991, the Court prepared a Minute Entry 
granting plaintiff's Motion to Strike Answer, Enter Default and 
Award Attorney's Fees. Once again, the Court properly sent a copy 
of the Minute Entry to Mr. Orton. 
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10. On May 30, 1991, plaintiff's attorney sent to Mr. 
Orton a copy of the proposed Order Striking Answer and Awarding 
Default Judgment and Attorney's Fees. 
11. On June 3, 1991, the Court signed the proposed 
order. 
12. On June 13, 1991, Clare Morse was personally served 
by a constable with two Motions and Orders in Supplemental 
Proceedings. One was served upon him in his capacity as the 
registered agent of Transamerica Equities, Inc., and the second was 
served upon him in his individual capacity. These motions fully 
explained on their face that judgment had been entered against both 
defendants in the amount of Fifty Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and 
No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00). Copies of these motions together with 
the constable's return of service.affidavits are attached^heretozas^ 
"Exhibit D" and "Exhibit E" and are incorporated herein by this 
reference. 
13. Clare Morse did not show up at the hearing which was 
scheduled for June 30, 1991. 
14. On July 10, 1991, Clare Morse was personally served 
by a constable for a second time with two Motions and Orders in 
Supplemental Proceedings. Copies of these two documents together 
with the constable's return of service affidavits are attached 
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hereto as "Exhibit F" and "Exhibit G" and are incorporated herein 
by this reference. 
15. Clare Morse did not show up at the hearing which was 
scheduled for July 23, 1991. 
16. On August 6, 1991, Clare Morse was personally served 
by a constable for a third time with two Orders to Show Cause. 
Copies of these two documents together with the constable's return 
of service affidavits are attached hereto as "Exhibit H" and 
"Exhibit I" and are incorporated herein by this reference. 
17. On August 12, 1991, one day before the Order to Show 
Cause hearing was scheduled, Clare Morse's new attorney, Wesley 
Sine, telephoned plaintiff's attorney and notified plaintiff's 
attorney that defendants had retained him to represent both 
defendants and that he would be fi-ling^  & motion to Set- Aside^ t^he" 
Default Judgment. 
18. On August 23, 1991, defendants' new attorney filed 
a Motion to Set Aside Sanctions and Judgment. 
II. ARGUMENT 
Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion to Set Aside 
Default Judgment correctly indicates that courts generally tend to 
favor granting relief from default judgments. But as the preceding 
statement of material facts makes clear, this case is anything but 
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typical and the defendants' total and complete neglect of this 
matter was anything but excusable. 
First, defendants' Memorandum states that Clare Morse and 
Transamerica Equities first learned that a judgment had been 
obtained against them on July 10, 1991 when Morse was served by a 
Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedings* (See paragraph 2 of 
Memorandum). In Morse's Affidavit, Morse testifies that if he had 
been aware that a motion preliminary to the granting of judgment 
had been mailed, he would have taken any action to obtain new 
counsel and respond timely. Both of these statements are 
contradicted by the facts. As Exhibits D and E make clear, Morse 
knew a judgment had been entered against him and his company on 
June 13, 1991, almost one month before he admits this knowledge and 
two full months before he took-any.ac1J.Qn_1:o hire new counsel or do 
anything about the judgment. In fact, if it were not for the order 
to show cause hearing and the imminent issuance of a bench warrant 
for Morse's arrest, it is doubtful that any response would have 
taken place even to this date. 
Second, defendants' memorandum states that defendants' 
attorney, Grant Orton, never received notice of plaintiff's 
judgment nor of the motion filed preliminary thereto (par. 3); that 
had Orton been aware of such a preliminary motion, he would have 
immediately responded (par. 6); that Orton was called up to serve 
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with the military from January through May, 1991 (par. 4 and third 
and fourth lines from the bottom of page 4); and that Orton was 
having problems with his mail from January through May of 1991 
(par. 4 and 5, and last 8 lines on page 4). These statements in 
the memorandum are further alleged in the Morse Affidavit which 
states that Orton was on military call from January to late May of 
1991 (Morse Aff., par. 5) and the Orton Affidavit which states as 
follows: Orton never had notice of the judgment or motions filed 
preliminary thereto (Orton Aff., par. 3); Orton had mail problems 
from January through May of 1991 (Orton Aff., par 4-5); and Orton 
would have timely responded if he had been aware of motions 
preliminary to the judgment (Orton Aff., par. 6). 
Once again, a review of the facts contradicts each 
representation made above* In the first £lace, even -if LOrt&n-Vs-
incredible story about having mail problems for a five month period 
of time is somehow accepted as truthful, it does not explain the 
telephone conversation which plaintiff's attorney had with Orton on 
April 18, 1991. In that telephone conversation, Orton apologized 
for neglecting to respond to the discovery, acknowledged receipt of 
the Court's April 5, 1991 Minute Entry granting plaintiff's Motion 
for Sanctions and requested that plaintiff's counsel grant him more 
time and send again the Request for Production of Documents 
(Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates, par. 3-4). If the Court questions 
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the Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates with respect to the telephone 
conversation, Exhibit B evidences a fax transmission on that date 
to Orton. It should be noted that Orton has never claimed that his 
fax machine was not working. Furthermore, Exhibit C evidences that 
in the ordinary course of billing for this case, plaintiff's 
attorney described a telephone conversation with Orton on April 18, 
1991 in which plaintiff's attorney denies Orton1s request for more 
time. Exhibits B and C were prepared in April of 1991, well 
before the issues raised by defendants' motion came to light. 
Consequently, the validity of Exhibit B and C is much more certain 
than the validity of affidavits which were prepared in anticipation 
of this motion. Exhibits B and C establish that Orton was not 
completely removed from his practice of law from January through 
May of 1991 as defendants' .memorandum and .affidavits -suggest; 
rather, in the middle of that period, Orton is documented as having 
a telephone conversation with plaintiff's attorney regarding the 
issues of the case and knew enough about the time frame imposed by 
the Court to request an extension of time. If Orton were placed 
under oath to testify regarding his practice from February through 
May of 1991, it is likely that Orton spent a substantial amount of 
time practicing law. 
If the facts of Ortonfs military service were to show 
that after his April 18, 1991 conversation with plaintiff's 
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attorney, Orton became too busy to practice law, Orton has a duty 
to inform his client of this fact and withdraw as counsel. Orton 
did not do this. This flagrant neglect of a legal matter entrusted 
to Orton is certainly not excusable within the meaning of the Rules 
of Civil Procedure. If defendants honestly believe this neglect 
injured their case, their remedy is to sue their attorney for 
malpractice* The defendants picked their attorney and the 
defendants — not the plaintiff — should bear the burden of their 
choice. It is interesting to note, however, that notwithstanding 
Orton*s total neglect of the case, defendants have not fired him. 
Instead, they have hired new counsel to work with Orton. 
In addition to Orton1s responsibility for the legal 
matters entrusted to him, Orton also bears the burden of solving 
any problems his legal practice has with-the delivery of his mail. 
From January through May of 1991, Orton was sent at least nine 
different packages of documents from plaintiff and the court. 
Orton claims none of these were received by him. Certainly a mail 
problem of this magnitude (if the Court believes this story) should 
become apparent to any reasonable person and should be solved in 
short order. Orton's failure to do this is not excusable neglect 
and plaintiff should not be forced to bear the burden of Orton*s 
failure to solve his alleged mail problem. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Although Courts should generally grant motions to set 
aside default judgments, this is one case where it should not be 
granted* The volume of work, time, and considerable expense 
involved in bringing this particular case to judgment and 
attempting to collect on that judgment takes it out of the ordinary 
scope of default judgments. While the plaintiff spent thousands of 
dollars jumping through a wide assortment of legal hoops and while 
the Court patiently granted defendants every opportunity to 
respond, defendants' attorney knowingly neglected the case. And 
while the plaintiff spent additional sums attempting to collect on 
the judgment, the defendants totally refused for two months to 
respond to the Court's orders to attend hearings in Supplemental 
Proceedings or take any action* to. set aside *he judgment. It is 
incredible that at this point, defendants are asking the Court to 
pretend the last seven months never happened. To grant this motion 
is to render totally ineffective the discovery process and to 
penalize plaintiff for diligently pursuing its remedies in good 
faith. 
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For these reasons, plaintiff respectfully requests that 
defendants' motion be denied. 
DATED this U. HA day of September, 1991. 
SCALLEY & READING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
L J ^ 
I hereby certify that on the _J day of September, 
1991, I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Opposition to Motion to Set Aside Sanctions and Judgment 
together with the Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates to the following: 
Wesley Fo Sine, Esq. 
647 Wc North Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84116^ 
Grant G. Orton, Esq, 
2670 South 2000 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
11L 
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Fo*o 6 SCAU.CY 
J . BltUCC RCAOING 
STCVCN K. WALKCMMO«ST 
MtCHACL W. SPCNCC 
MAHLON L. BATCS 
DAVIO M. CA»U»ON 
SCOTT N. RASMUSSCN 
Lorn NICLSCN J en* AH 
LAW Orrtcc* 
SCALLEY & READING 
A MtOrCSStOMAk COARCTATION 
SUITC 2 0 0 
261 CAST JOO SOUTH 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84W 
February 22, 1991 
TCIXPHONC 
AACA COOC •©< 
SJ I -7S70 
fACSIMILC 
AACA COOC SOI 
S31-7S6S 
Grant Orton, Esquire 
2670 South 2000 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Re: Kendrick Brothers Construction v. Morse and Transamerica 
Equities 
Dear Mr. Orton: 
My records indicate that our Request for Production of 
Documents was mailed to you on January 18, 1991c Consequently, I 
believe the 30 days allowed by the Rules of Civil Procedure have 
expired. I will grant a one week extension of time to produce 
these documents but if I do not receive the documents on or before 
Friday, March 1, 1991, I will bring a motion to compel their 
production and will request sanctions. 
Sincerely, 
SCALLEY & READING 
Marlon L. Bates 
btr 
cc: Tom Kendrick, Sr. 
C: \MLB\LT*3\ORTOH 5 . 0*A 
L-* Ornccs 
SCALLEY & READING 
FORO G. SCALLCY A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION TCICPHONC 
J . B R U C E R C A O I N O S U I T E a o o A " E A C O O C « O I 
S t e v e n K . W A L K C N M O R S T * 3 i - r « 7 o 
MlCMACL W. SRENCE * « ' 6A*T 3 0 0 SOOTH 
M A R L O N U B A T E S ^ ^
 C U T A H a 4 m FACSIMIIX 
JOMN E. HANSCN AREA COOC aoi 
Scorr N. RASMUSSEN 531-7900 
JOHN E. SWALLOW 
STCVCN B SMITH 
FACSIMILE COVER LETTER 
PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING PAGES TO: 
NAME: Grant H. Orton, Esq. 
LOCATION: 3098 Highland Drive #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
FACS. NO: (801) 487-3502 
DOCUMENT(S) SENT FROM: 
NAME: Marlon L. Bates, Esquire 
LOCATION: SCALLEY & READING 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
TEL. NO: (801) 531-7870 
FACS. NO: (801) 531-7968 
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAGES INCLUDING THIS COVER LETTER: 5 
DATE: April 18, 1991-
TIME: 4:50 p.m. 
IF YOU DO NOT RECEIVE ALL THE PAGES, PLEASE CALL BACK AS SOON AS 
POSSIBLE. IF YOU HAVE PROBLEMS, PLEASE CONTACT: Bonnie 
COMMENTS: 
261 East 300 Southy sunt *w« 
Salt lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
Kendric* 8rothers Construction Co. 
Attn: Ton Kendrick 
4015 South 300 Uest 
Murray, Utah 84107 
April 30, IWl 
Page 1 
Clients 53014 
Hatter: 08 
Invoice I 4816 
Matter: Cowiercul Property Mortgage Corporation 
Date Professional Services Rendered 
04/18/91 Conference with opposing counsel; send sicqnd. 
set of docunent request to hm and deny 
additional tine to respond. 
04/23/91 Conference with Tan; draft notion to str ike, 
nenorandun of law, and aff idavit ; f i l e with 
court. 
Hours 
0.30 
1.00 
Anount 
34.50 
115.00 
Total Hours 1.30 Total Services 
Totals for this natter: 
Prior balance 
8alance due 
149.50 
3,367,89 
3,517.39 
Current 
A C C O U N T A G I N G 
Over 30 Over 40 Over 90 Total 
3,517.3? 
Interest charges at W. on accounts over 31 days. 
£fffa-J. BRUCE READING, #2700 MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLAHE_JLL_MQRSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
MOTION AND ORDER OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
Civil NO.910900069CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
In the above-entitled action, plaintiff moves the Court 
for an order requiring defendant, Clare T. Morse, to appear before 
this Court to answer questions under oath concerning its property, 
and to restrain defendant from disposing of its non-exempt property 
pending the hearing. Judgment_was .entered against defendant on the 
date of June 3, 1991, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Two Hundred 
Thirty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) of which Fifty 
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) is 
still unpaid. 
DATED this || day of June, 1991. 
SCALLEY & READING 
SvWan^f • 
f C:\MLB\PLEASIN0\M0KSE.3V? 
Marlbn L. Bat^s 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
fitty 
ORDER 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, CLARE T. MORSE: 
IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to the foregoing motion and 
good cause appearing, you appear in person before this Court at the 
time and place shown below to answer questions under oath 
concerning your property. 
DATE : Thursday, June 20, 1991 
TIME : 8:30 a.m. 
PLACE: Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Room #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED not- to sell, loan, give, away, or 
otherwise dispose of your non-exempt property pending this hearing. 
If you have been personally served with this order and you fail to 
appear, the Court may order a warrant for your arrest. 
DATED this // ' day of June, 1991. 
BY T 
Lrcuit Court Judge 
Attest Clerk of the Circuit Court 
q* 
Serve Defendant: 
Clare T. Morse, President and Registered Agent 
Transamerica Equities, Inc. 
6292 South 320 West #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
or 
Clare T, Morse 
1600 West 11400 South 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
C: \ML8\Pt£ADlh<?\M0RSC.3UP 2 
I am a duly appoint^ Deputy Constable OT wng^ i^w..^-» _ 
tate of Utah, a citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the 
ime of service herinf and not a part of or interested in the withia action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
>n the 12 of JUNE , 1991 , and served the same upon MORSE, CLARE T. 
( 
within named defendant in said, ( 
( 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
>y serving a true copy of said, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
for the defendant with CLARE T. MORSE (PERSONALLY) 
a person of suitable age and descretion there residing at, 
1600 WEST 11400 SOUTH • SOUTH JORDAN 
his/her usual place of ABODE • on this 13 day of JUNE ,f9S 
I further certify that at the time of service of the said, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
I endoresed the date and place of service and added my name and offical 
title therto. 
On the 13 day of JUNE , 1991 
Deputy ^ ^ A H ^ / 
Deputy Constable 
Sandy Precinct, Salt Lake County 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this On the 13 day of JUNE , 1991 
My Commissian Expires: April 20 199S 
ih Notarr Public j L > < W fflt />/jj/.^ \ $ t 8 t ' ° f U t * ' 
Fee 's Serv ice Fee /I 6.00/y | 
Mi leage {/ U \ 
2nd address 
3rd address 
Copies 
P&H/Ext ra 's 
To ta l 6 .00 
NOTARY PUBUC 
JEAKY UsOSLUM 
t » s North «75w#«t 
W*st Bound**. UT 54067 
My Commotion Expir m 
Apr! 20,1995 
STATE OF UTAH 
N 
o >*rft J. BRUCE READING, #2700 MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
MOTION AND ORDER OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
Civil NO.910900069CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
In the above-entitled action, plaintiff moves the Court 
for an order requiring defendant, Transamerica Equities, Inc., to 
appear before this Court to answer questions under oath concerning 
its property, and to restrain defendant from disposing of its non-
exempt property pending the hearing.- Judgment was entered, against 
defendant on the date of June 3, 1991, in the amount of Fifty 
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) of 
which Fifty Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and No/100 Dollars 
($50,230.00) is still unpaid. 
DATED this \\ day of June, 1991. 
QyXOrcT. Oficrsc- pns +Aqen/" SCALLEY & READING 
Mar] L. Bat* 
-f^Vc Z 1Z0 CK> *t3o>. 1>«^-J~ Attorney*for P la int i f f 
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ORDER 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.: 
IT IS ORDERED, that, pursuant to the foregoing motion and 
good cause appearing, yOu appear in person before this Court at the 
time and place shown below to answer questions under oath 
concerning your property. 
DATE : Thursday, June 20, 1991 
TIME : 8:30 a.m. 
PLACE: Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Room #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED not "to sell, loan, give away,--or 
otherwise dispose of your non-exempt property pending this hearing. 
If you have been personally served with this order and you fail to 
appear, the Court may order a warrant for your arrest. 
DATED this //-- day of June, 1991. 
BYTHE COURT: • 
Circuit Court Judge 
Attest Clerk of the Circuit Court 
By: ~£y^ . 9* 
Serve Defendant: 
Transamerica Equities, Inc. 
6292 South 320 West #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
C: \MLB\PLEADINa\TRANSAME.SUP 2 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable of SandV Precinct, ;>«±v ^ «^^ 
tate of Utah, a citizen of the United States 6ver the age of 21 years at the 
line of service her in, and not a part of or interested in the withinr action. 
1 received the within and hereto annexed, 
4JPPLEHENTAL ORDER 
>n the 12 of JUNE , 1991 , and served the same upon TRANSAHERICA EQUITIES INC. 
( 
i within named defendant in said, ( 
( 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
:>y serving a true copy of said, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
for the defendant with CLARE T. MORSE (PRESIDENT) 
a person of suitable ag^ and descretion there residing at, 
1600 WEST 11400 SOUTH • SALT LAKE CITY 
his/her usual place of A80DE . on this 13 day of JUNE ,59 
I further certify that at the time of service of the said, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
I endoresed the date and place
 Df service and added my. name and offical 
title therto. 
On the 13 day of JUNE , 1991 
Deputy^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Deputy Constable 
Sandy Precinct, Salt Lake County 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this On the 13 day of JUNE , 1991 
My Commissian Expires: April 20 199S ^ 
Notary Public H / OsnM ('/£ COJ^*^-^J State of Utah 
hOT^BY PUBLIC 
J*AK*Ut?AJil±Mi 
Fee s s e r v i c e ^ ^ </ ^
 0<y n M j ' n w*aBoi*rtiu.uTS4087 
Mileage 
9nH address I xSLZSy A<xt2o. i»s 
3rd address 
Copies 
P&H/Extra's _ - _ _ = = = = = = = = = = « 
^ . 20 .00 
Total 
0 
M- 5 J99i 
J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DATF/^JCA i //TIME. 
UPC QJjWA-T' &afl&L*z— 
'-:;::;:JTY UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSg and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
MOTION AND ORDER OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
Civil NO.910900069CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
In the above-entitled action, plaintiff moves the Court 
for an order requiring defendant, Clare T. Morse, to appear before 
this Court to answer questions under oath concerning its property, 
and to restrain defendant from disposing of its non-exempt property 
pending the hearing. Judgment was^  entered against defendant on the-
date of June 3, 1991, in the amount of Fifty Thousand Two Hundred 
Thirty Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) of which Fifty 
Thousand Two Hurdred Th:L^» and Nc/100 Dollars- ($50,230.00) is 
still unpaid. 
DATED this Z*0 day of June, 1991. 
SCALLEY & READING 6&)Z So. 3U l/C. &Z4C 
yvturrau 
16,00 U). fltfOOZo. 
So. Jpfd*t) Marl Attorney 
C: \HL8\PUA&ING\M0RSE2.SUF 
ORDER 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, CLARE T. MORSE: 
IT ts ORDERED that, pursuant to the foregoing motion and 
good cause appearing, you appear in person before this Court at the 
time and pl^ce shovm below to answer questions under oath 
concerning yo^r property. 
DATfe 
TIMfc 
PLA^E 
3uk23 
Tuesday, 7wlipiifl^ 1991 
8:30 a.m. 
Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Room #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED ndf'to sell, loan, give away, -or 
otherwise dispose
 Qf your non-exempt property pending this hearing. 
If you have b^en personally served with this order and you fail to 
appear, the C< u^rt may order a warrant for your arrest. 
DAT^;D this &>Q " day of June, 1991. 
BY THjag^URT: ^^ # 
j ^ j J U ^ r c u i t Court Judge _^ 
A t t e s t Clerk of the STroiii^7 Court 
By: <£jy 
Serve Defendant: 
Clare T. Mors^/ President and Registered Agent 
Transaxnerica Equities, Inc. 
6292 South 32Q west #200 
or 
Clare T* Morsq 
1600 West 114Qo South 
South Jordan, utah 84065 
C:\MLB\PLEADiaO\HOKSE2.SUF 2 
I. S. MANN 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
i citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service 
herin, and not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
on the 5 of JULY , 1991 , and served the same upon MORSE, CLARE T. 
( 
a within named defendant in said, ( 
( 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
by serving a true copy of said, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
for the defendant with CLARE T. MORSE (PERSONALLY) 
a person of suitable age arxi descretion there residing at, 
1600 WEST 11400 SOUTH , SOUTH JORDAN 
his/her usual place of ABODE , on this 10 day of JULY
 f199 
I further certify that at the time of service of the said, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
I endoresed the date and place of service and added my name and^offical 
title therto. 
On the 10 day of JULY , 1991 
Deputy y^~\ 
Deput^ -etfns table 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Robert J. Reitz Constable 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this On the 10 day of JULY , 1991 
My Commissian Expires: April 20 1995 
Notary Public 
Fee's Service Fee 
Mileage 
2nd address 
3rd address 
Copies 
P&H/Extra's 
Total 25.00 
5 
•)<h 
JUL 0 l I lm*\t «•!*• I -w 
J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
S^f.J-iSrCIUJl ? - . ^ t . v J : i T Y UTAH 
TEPUTY i ^ ^T"^^^^2^-
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TPiMglMRBTrft FfflTTTTEg TMP. 
Defendants. 
MOTION AND ORDER OF 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROCEEDINGS 
Civil NO.910900069CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
In the above-entitled action, plaintiff moves the Court 
for an order requiring defendant, Transamerica Equities, Inc., to 
appear before this Court to answer questions under oath concerning 
its property, and to restrain defendant from disposing of its non-
exempt property pending the hearing, Judgment was entered against, 
defendant on the date of June 3, 1991, in the amount of Fifty 
Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and No/100 Dollars ($50,230.00) of 
which Fifty Thousand Two Hundred Thirty and No/100 Dollars 
($50,230.00) is still unpaid. 
_ . /„ DATED this ^ € day of June, 1991. 
^ 2 . <$V 2&U). ^iSt ' J ' SCALLEY & READING 
or 
C: \HI.B\n.EAMNG\TJWISAM2.SUF 
Marlon L. Bates 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ORDER 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC.: 
IT IS ORDERED that, pursuant to the foregoing motion and 
good cause appearing, you appear in person before this Court at the 
time and place shown below to answer questions under oath 
concerning your property. ^ i „ 
oUAuZo 
DATE : Tuesday, tTjpi'f ^ , 1991 
TIME : 8:30 a.m. 
PLACE: Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Room #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
YOU ARE FURTHER ORDERED not to sell, loan, give away, or 
otherwise dispose of your non-exempt property pending this hearing. 
If you have been personally served with this order and you fail to 
appear, the Court may order a warrant for your arrest. 
DATED this (90 day of June, 1991. 
BY_™»E^COURT: 
§XuiX\ccj -Circuit—Court Judg*e ^ ) .^ 
A t t e s t Clerk of the Circuit 'Court 
By: <^k 
Serve Defendant: 
Transamerica Equities, Inc. 
6292 South 320 West #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
or 
Transamerica Equites, Inc. 
c/o Clare T. Morse, President 
1600 West 11400 South 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
C: \MLB\PLEADIW 0\TRAKSAM2. SUP 
EXHIBIT V I I 
:!L£D 
DiSTPiCrOOUR"r 
APR Z3 4 3? PH'91 
TH-
?.±> T 
u; STRICT 
STY 
BY 
^ftrft :>-'^Tf CLERK J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO STRIKE ANSWER AND AWARD 
DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND ATTORNEY'S 
FEES 
Civil NO.910900069CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
In response to plaintiff's Motion to Compel Production of 
Documents, this Court ordered defendants to produce the long 
awaited documents within 15 days of the Court's minute entry or the 
defendants' answer would be struck and default judgment would be 
entered against defendants as prayed for in plaintiff's complaint. 
The defendants have wholly failed to produce said documents or any 
of them within said period of time (See Affidavit of Marlon L. 
Bates, par. 3). Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 37(b), plaintiff is 
entitled to receive an order striking defendants' answer and 
granting default judgment in the amount of Fifty Thousand and 
No/100 Dollars ($50,000.00) together with lost profits of the joint 
C:\m.B\PLEADING\MOBSB.MEM 
venture, prejudgment interest at the legal rate, punitive damages, 
court costs, and attorney's fees incurred herein, all in amounts to 
be proved upon an evidentiary hearing, and attorney's fees in the 
amount of One Hundred Fifteen and No/100 Dollars ($115.00) for 
bringing the Motion to Compel, and attorney's fees in the amount of 
One Hundred Fifteen and No/100 Dollars ($115-00) for bringing this 
Motion to Strike, together with its accompanying Memorandum of 
Points and Authorities and the Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates, 
attorney for plaintiff. 
DATED this ^ 3 day of April, 1991. 
SCALLEY & READING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the 23 day of April, 1991, 
I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Motion to Strike 
Answer and Award Default Judgment and Attorney's Fees together with 
Affidavit of Marlon L. Bates to the following: 
Grant G. Orton, Esq. 
2670 South 2000 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
^ffrnnio \?nnd_ 
C:\MLB\PLEADING\MORSE.MEM 2 
EXIBIT V I I I 
WESLEY F. SINE (2967) 
Attorney for Defendants 
349 South 200 East, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-5125 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendant So 
REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO 
SET ASIDE SANCTIONS AND 
JUDGMENT 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Civil No.: 910900069CN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
From January of 1991 to the end of May of 1991, Grant 
Orton (attorney for Defendants Transamerica Equities, Inc., 
and Clare T. Morse), served as an Army Reserve Battalion 
Commander of the 141'st M.I. Battalion. During that period 
of time, part of his unit was called up, necessitating Grant 
Orton1s efforts to follow through on their call up. During 
part of that period Grant Orton was out of the state on 
military call up and during part of that time was at the local 
headquarters for the 141'st military intelligence battalion. 
On his part it was not a full time call up but it did take 
him away from his practice of law for a considerable amount 
of the time. 
This Judgment was taken during that period of time. 
Defendants claim that but for this national emergency and a 
subsequent problem with their attorney's mail collection, this 
Judgment would not have happened. 
Section 60 (b)(1) of U.C.A. allows for a setting aside 
of a judgment if within three months of the Judgment on a basis 
of excusable neglect. The Judgment was taken on June 3, 1991 
and a Motion to Set Aside was filed on August 23, 1991. This 
falls within those paramaters, since 6he Motion was taken well 
within the three month allowance. 
II. STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
1. Grant Orton in his Affidavit of August 23, 1991 stated 
in paragraph number 4 that "During the months of January through 
May 1991, I have had numerous military assignments outside 
of the state of Utah". 
2. Grant Orton further states that while he was away, 
"the mail has been retained on occasion by the postal service 
when his part time secretary did not pick it up in a timely 
fashion"e 
3. Grant Orton further states that there was not mail 
retained for him at the post office. 
4. Grant Orton also states in his Affidavit that "he 
had never received notice of Plaintiff's Judgment nor of the 
motions filed preliminary to the granting of the Judgment". 
-2-
5o Answers to interrogatories were filed with the 
Plaintiffs, 
6C On April 18, 1991, under Plaintiff's Statement of 
Facts (par, 6), Plaintiff's attorney claims he spoke with Grant 
Orton but further on down states that Plaintiff's attorney 
spoke with Mrc Morse; but this must be a mistake as there is 
no evidence that he spoke with Mr. Morse, only Grant Orton. 
7. Clare T. Morse was not the registered agent of 
Transamerica Equities or its President .at- the time of service 
of the Supplemental Hearing Motion and Order (see exhibit A). 
Ill, ARGUMENT 
The period of time, within which Plaintiff complains of 
"an inexcusable pattern of total neglect", falls during the 
crisis in the Gulf War, Grant Orton is a citizen soldier 
serving as the Commander of the 141'st Military Batallion for 
the Army Reserve, While his whole unit was not called up during 
the War, approximately half of it was called to active duty 
necessitating his call up for periods of time to effect their 
call up and later their reactivation after the peace was won. 
This all happened during the period of time complained of and 
caused the problems complained of by the Plaintiff. Most of 
the items complained of can be explained not upon willfull 
denial of the law, but because of the particular situation 
that attorney Orton found himself in, plus a lack of 
communication caused by a problem with the mail which was not 
timely discovered due to the military obligations of attorney 
-3-
Orton. So far as Clare T. Morse not answering the Supplemental 
Hearings timely, these items were also turned over to Grant 
Orton who was to apply for a setting aside of the judgment, 
but again because of military obligations it was not handled. 
Defendant's attorney tried to cover all bases, i.e., 
serving his country and protecting his clients. Unfortunately, 
this particular Plaintiff was not concerned with its country's 
problems but only in expediting an unconscionable lawsuit and 
took advantage of Mr. Orton1s military obligations. Mr. Orton 
had arranged for his mail to be held for him but during the 
period of April, May, and June something happened that prevented 
the mail from reaching Mr. Orton. Therefore this Judgment 
was taken without the Defendants knowing of it until being 
served for a Supplemental Hearing. 
Once again the Defendants turned to their trusted legal 
counsel to straighten out the Default Judgment problem but 
the military was still calling and Lieutenant Colonel Orton 
was now striving to deactivate his people once again pulling 
him away from his legal responsibilities. This is why the 
present counsel was hired to represent the plaintiffs until 
Grant Orton could committ enough time to represent them 
properly. 
Mr. Orton could not solve his mail problem until he was 
aware of the problem, by the time he was aware of the problem, 
the damage had been done. Problems with mail is not an unheard 
-4-
of event. Coupled with his partial military call up created 
the problem we have here. 
IV, CONCLUSION 
This case cries out for justice. Rule 60(b)(1) is written 
for this type of problem. A war, a lawyer who is a citizen 
soldier, a mix up with the mail all added together have caused 
damage to Defendants by a default judgment having been given 
to the Plaintiffs upon a complaint which was defendable by 
Defendants* Plaintiffs will not be hurt if this is set aside 
so that Defendants may have their day in court; but justice 
will be served. 
All of us should feel a debt of gratitude for citizen 
soldiers like Grant Orton and we should not penalize the 
Defendants because the lawyer they chose was dedicated to 
serving his country and failed to adequately represent them 
because of a mix up in the mail and the military pressures 
of the moment. Certainly a once in a life time problem should 
not be left uncorrected. 
For these reasons Defendants respectfully request their 
Motion be allowed and the Judgment sent aside. 
DATED this J23&/&*Y o f September, 199V. 
/^-WESLEY F. SIN^ 
Attorney for'Defendants 
-5-
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the day of September, 1991, 
I mailed a true and correct copy, postage pre-paid of the 
foregoing REPLY TO PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO MOTION TO SET 
ASIDE SANCTIONS AND JUDGMENT to: 
J. Bruce Reading 
Marlon L. Bates 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
261 East 300 South 
Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/Samantha Lane £x 
EXHIBIT IX 
Wesley F. Sine (2967) 
Attorney for Defendant 
349 South 200 East, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-5125 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION ] 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff, 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., ] 
Defendants. 
• AFFIDAVIT OF GRANT G. ORTi 
i Civil No.: 91090069CN 
JUDGE: WILKINSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
GRANT G. ORTON, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. That I am an adult citizen over the age of 18 
and resident of the United States of America and of the State 
of Utah, and I make this Affidavit on the basis of facts that 
are within my personal knowledge in support of Defendant's 
Motion to Set Aside Judgment filed and served herewith. 
2. I am now and at all times since 1977 have been a 
member in good standing of the Utah State Bar engaged in the 
active full-time practice of law in the State of Utah. 
3. Upon reviewing the files and inquiring into this 
natter I found that I had never received notice of plaintiff's 
Judgment nor of the Motions apparently filed preliminary to 
the granting of Judgment„ 
4. The mail to my office is delivered to a mail box 
in front of the building where my office is located,, During 
the months of January through May 1991, I have had numerous 
military assignments outside of the State of Utah, and during 
that time the mail has been retained on occasion by the Postal 
Service when my part-time secretary has not picked it up in 
a timely fashion* 
5. In the past when this happened, it has been retained 
by the post office for it to be picked up there. Upon checking 
with the post office I have not found that this was the case 
since there is no such mail retained by the Postal Service. 
6o Had I become aware from any source that a Motions 
preliminary to the granting of judgment had been served in 
any manner, including by mail, I would have-taken action 
necessary to timely prepare, file and~serve an appropriate 
response thereto. 
M 
7. >>, Transamerica Equities, and Clare T. Morse, hold 
and claim valid and meritorious defenses and-offsets to each 
of the issues raised by plaintiff's 
complaint, and have asserted them inj»y answer. 
DATED this >jp(// day of August, 1991. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this c£S^W day of August, 
1191 . 
-9-
X 9 & • riTNlli 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service 
lerin, and not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
>n the 5 of JULY , 1991 , and served the same upon TRANSAMERICA EQUITIESf 
(INC. 
i within named defendant in said, ( 
( 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
oy serving a true copy of said, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
for the defendant with CLARE T. MORSE (PRESIDENT & RES AGENT) 
a person of suitable age and descretion there residing at, 
1600 WEST 11400 SOUTH • SOUTH JORDAN 
his/her usual place of A800E , on this 10 day of JULY,19s 
I further certify that at the time of service of the said, 
SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER 
I endoresed the date and place_pf_service_and added my name^and.offical 
title therto. 
On the 10 day of JULY, 1991 
Deputy Constable 
Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
Robert J. Reitz Constable 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this -On the 10 day of JUL , 1991 
My Commissian Expires* April 20 1995 
Notary Public (j / s> _ .>, /fl^^Ti^/y/f /State of Utah 
Fee's Service Fee 
Mileage 
2nd address 
3rd address 
Copies 
P&H/Extra's 
Total 6.00 
JUL 2 5 !99i CAniDii n 
J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
UPON f*->Wl 
:»~AcJ>4*. ffe/f*. etc mi 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, INC., 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
i - .Defendants. 
iLOO yd. MHo. 
Civil NO.910900069CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, CLARE T. MORSE: 
ttffAU I-t appears..from the records of this court that.you_were 
V ordered to appear in person before the District Court at the-time 
and place shown below to answer questions under oath concerning 
your property. 
Date: July 23, 1991 
Time: 8:30 a.m. 
Place: Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Room #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The records of this court further show that the order was 
served upon you, and that you failed to appear as required. 
C:\MLB\PLEADINO\MORSE.OSC 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that you appear in person before 
a judge of the District Court at: 
Date: August 13, 1991 
Time: 8:30 a.m. 
Place: Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Room #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
to show cause why you should not be punished for contempt of court 
for failure to obey a lawful order of this court* 
DATED this
 < ^ ^ day of July, 1991. 
District Court Judge 
Attest Clerk of the District Court 
By: <g<^ 
Deputy/Clerk 
Serve Defendant: 
Clare T. Morse, President and_Registered Agept 
Transamerica Equities, Inc. 
6292 South 320 West #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
or 
Clare T* Morse 
1600 West 11400 South 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
C: \MLB\PLEADINO\MORSE. OSC 2 
I, O. HAOSEN • being rii^v ~~*,v — • -
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constablet Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service 
>rinf and not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
*DER TO SHOW CAUSE 
n the 25 of JULY , 1991 , and served the same upon HORSE
 9 CLARE T. 
within named defendant in said, ( 
( 
RDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
y serving a true copy of said, 
RDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
or the defendant with CLARE T. MORSE (PERSONALLY) 
person of suitable age and descretion there residing at, 
L600 WEST 11400 SOUTH . SOUTH JORDAN 
Us/her usual place of ABODE , on this 6 day of AUG ,199 
I further certify that at the time of service of the said, 
5RDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
I endoresed the date and pl,ace of. service_ and added my. name and offical_ 
title therto* 
On the 6 day of AUG , 1991 
Deputy 
SL 802 
Robert Reitz Constable, Salt Lake County 
396 Cypress St..Midvale UT . 84047 580-1741 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this On the 6 day of AUG , 1991 
My Commissian Expires: April 20 1995 ^ 
Notary Public ^\td^UA ('/t ( A A £ I ^ ^ \ State of Utah 
**Sl v"C°Tr5fcv NOTARY PU8UC 
6 - 0<7 A /%2^^»v JEANY McCLctLAN 
1 O 0<V ff/^^V^ 12SS North 675 Wc« 
1*7 . W I f«/ « 3 3 | \ toi
 w#st Bountiful. UT &403 
c A e » s Service Fee / / Ql/\ fffg3&;&\ 22sNortherow** 
tee S * i' IV
 mVKT I ( : ( T C O r ) § } W«a Bountiful. UT &4037 
*HHr e S S 1 0 . 0 0 %%H^M My Comnmion -*P,es 
adareso I NC1^--^/ AOTH 20.1995 dress | ^ i ^ STATE of UT AH 
es 
Extra's 
35.00 
k»#*l 19W1 I I 
J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2$1 East 300 South, Suit© 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
to ftyl 
C*n.//*y«. fTt.1^ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JT/CO' 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION : 
COMPANY, INC., 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
gRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
,„,-.,, / L, ^ Defendants. 
Civil NO.910900069CN 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
Of THE STATE OF UTAH TO DEFENDANT, TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC: 
00 |/v. lllfCv^>C. it appears from the records of this court that you were 
ordered to appear in person before^ the_£istricjb_ Court_at the_t±me_ 
and place shown below to answer questions under oath concerning 
your property. 
Date: July 23, 1991 
Time: 8:30 a.m. 
Place: Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Room #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
The records of this court further show that the order was 
served upon you, and that you failed to appear as required. 
j^Au-J^ lw«Jt* 
C:\MLB\PLEADIN0\TRANSAMK.O3C 
It O. MADSEN 9 being TIT^V* wvi*/f — 
I am a duly appointed Deputy Constable, Salt Lake County* State of Utah, 
citizen of the United States over the age of 21 years at the time of service 
rin, and not a part of or interested in the within action. 
I received the within and hereto annexed, 
4DER TO SHOW CAUSE 
n the 25 of JULY , 1991 , and served the same upon TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, 
(INC. 
within named defendant in said, ( 
( 
RDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
y serving a true copy of said, 
«DER TO SHOW CAUSE 
or the defendant with CLARE T* MORSE (REG^GENT) 
t person of suitable age and descretion there residing at, 
L600 WEST 11400 SOUTH , SOUTH JORDAN 
his/her usual place of ABODE , on this 6 day of AUG
 P19S 
I further certify that at the time of service of the said, 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
I endoresed the date and place of s.er.vice. and adde.d jny name and offical 
title thertOc 
On the 6 day of AUG , 1991 
Deputy SL 802 
Robert Reit2 Constable, Salt Lake County 
396 Cypress St.,Midvale UT . 84047 580-174 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this On the 6 day of AUG 
My Commissian Expires: April 20 1995 
Notary Public 
Fee's Service Fee A 6.00/ 
Mileage 
2nd address 
3rd address 
Copies 
P&H/Extra's 
MtCUt* 
> 
1991 
State of Utah 
NOTARY PUBUC 
JEANY McCLcUAM 
129$ North 67$ West 
W*st Bountifui, UT e-087 
My Cor.vnis6.on *• \; ?s 
STATE Cr UTAH 
Tota l 6.00 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that you appear in person before 
a judge of the District Court at: 
Date: August 13, 1991 
Time: 8:30 a.m. 
Place: Third District Court 
240 East 400 South 
Room #303 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
to show cause why you should not be punished for contempt of court 
for failure to obey a lawful order of this court. 
DATED this J&Z- day of July, 1991. 
ristrict Court Judge 
Attest Clerk of the District Court 
By:, 
Deputy^ Clerk 
Serve Defendant: 
Clare T, Morse, President and Registered Agent 
Transaroerica Equities, Inc. 
6292 South 320 West #200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
or 
Clare T. Morse 
1600 West 11400 South 
South Jordan, Utah 84065 
C:\ML8\PLEADING\TRAKSAME.OSC 2 
wi^£-_ 
NOTMIJ^yBLIC 
PodTdiJWTSSCt I Resjt 
I 
I 
I 
Notarypublic 
WESIEYJ 
T 
SINE I 
340 SdutiaOO East *170 I 
Salt Uks-Ctty.Uah 84111! 
MyCommiMton Expire* I 
JamaiySBJMS | 
• V^J^X' SttBoTbtah 
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EXHIBIT X 
WESLEY F. SINE (ZVbl) 
Attorney tor Defendants 
343 South 200 East, Suite 1/0 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-b12b 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
&ENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPNAY, INC., 
Plaintitf, 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants, 
AFFIDAVIT OF CLARE T. MORSE 
Civil No,: 9109000b9CN 
JUDGE: WILKINSON 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE) 
CLARE T. MORSE, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes 
and says: 
1. That I am an adult citizen over the age of 18 and 
resident of the United States of America and of the State of 
Utah, and I make this Affidavit on the basis of facts that are 
within my personal knowledge in support of Defendant's Motion 
To Set Aside Judgment filed and served herewith. 
2. I am now and at all times since 1987 have been an 
officer for Transamerica Equities, Inc. 
3. That on behalf of myself and Transamerica Equities, 
Inc., I contacted and hired Grant Orton, an attorney in good 
standing as a member of the Utah State Bar to represent myself 
and Transamerica Equities Inc. in a lawsuit brought by Kendrick 
Brothers Construction Company, Inc. on or about the 7th day 
of January 1991. 
4. That at all times I believed that our attorney Grant 
Orton was properly representing myself and Transamerica 
Equities and was not in default with the Court or the 
plaintiff. 
5. That during the fall of 1990 and from January to 
late May of 1991, Grant Orton was on mTlitary "call"up caused 
by the Desert Storm invasion. 
6<> That it was my understanding that during the time 
he was away on military call up, that arrangements had been 
made by Mr. Orton to protect defendants' rights in this 
lawsuit. 
7. That I, nor Transamerica Equities knew that certain 
documents had not been delivered to the plaintiffs per court 
orderc 
8* That I, nor Transamerica Equities knew of the Default 
Judgment entered against us by the Court on or about the 3rd 
day of June, 1 991 . 
9. That if I or Transamerica Equities had become aware 
from any source that a Motion preliminary to the granting 
of Judgment had been served in any manner including mail, 
I would have taken any action necessary to timely obtain new 
counsel to timely prepare, file, and serve an appropriate 
response thereto. 
10c I and Transamerica Equities have, hold, and claim 
valid and meritorious defenses and offsets to each of the 
issues raised by plaintiffs complaint, and have asserted them 
in our Answer* 
11o I and Transamerica Equities have hired new counsel 
to work with Grant Orton on representing us in the future. 
DATED this J&MSay of August, 1991. 
CLARlTr. MORSE, personally 
TRANSAMERI 
BY: Sr. V.P. 
I b C > l |..y commit:... JT^=: I 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this day of 
August, *l 991 . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correc 
foregoing Affidavit of Clare T. Morse, was served upon 
plaintiff by mailing the same, postage prepaid, to Plaintiff's 
Attorneys, J. Bruce Reading and Marlon L. Bates, at 261 East 
J00 South, Suite 200, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, postage 
prepaid, on the J. 3 4 day of August, 1991. 
'"I 
I 
-*i\t>~ dL 
amantha Lane 
EXHIBIT XI 
J. BRUCE READING, #2700 
MARLON L. BATES, #4794 
SCALLEY & READING 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION : ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
COMPANY, INC., TO SET ASIDE SANCTIONS AND 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : 
CLARE T. MORSE and Civil No.910900069CN 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants. : Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
This matter was heard by the Court on October 18, 1991 
with Wesley F. Sine appearing as counsel for defendants and with 
Marlon L. Bates appearing as counsel for plaintiff. Based upon the 
motion of the defendants, the opposition of the plaintiff, the 
memoranda and affidavits in support thereof, and the arguments made 
by counsel at the hearing, 
C:\MLB\PLEADING\KENDRICK.ORD 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that defendants' Motion to Set Aside 
Sanctions and Judgment is denied. 
DATED this 3' day of October, 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ~ 7"%sx^t 
Judge Wilkinson 
Wesley F* 'Sine 
Attorney for Defendants 
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EXHIBIT X I I 
r p 'r-'n 
A 
§ 
^ 
WESLEY F. SINE (2967) 
Attorney for Defendants 
349 South 200 East, Suite 170 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 364-5125 
O i r i i r - I C T C O U R T 
Nov 4 I OTP^9I 
THIRD • 'TJCT 
SALT ' ' 
BY_r*YVV£naf*-— DLfti' i 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENDRICK BROTHERS CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, INC., 
Plaintiff and appellees, 
vs. 
CLARE T. MORSE and 
TRANSAMERICA EQUITIES, INC., 
Defendants and Appellees. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
Civil No. 910900069CN 
'MM 
few 
NOTICE is hereby given that defendants and appellants, 
Clare T. Morse and Transamerica Equities, Inc. through counsel, 
Wesley Fe Sine, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court, the final 
order of the Honorable Wilkinson, entered in this matter on 
October 31, 1991. 
The Appeal is taken from the Order of the Court denying 
defendants' Motion to Set Aside Sanctions and Jj^ Tcigment, 
2SLEY F. SINE 
Attorney for Defendants 
00193 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL, postage prepaid to the 
following: 
Je Bruce Reading 
Marlon L. Bates 
Scalley & Reading 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
C/at/rr?as*t£*- O^XJZ 
Samantha Lane 
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EXHIBIT XIII 
o<o 
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC SUPPLY 
COMPANY, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
. PAUL W. LARSEN CONTRACTOR, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, et at., Defend-
ants and Respondents. 
No. 14040. 
Supremo Court of Utah. 
Dec. 18, 1075. 
Suit was instituted against a general 
contractor and its bondsman to recover for 
materials supplied by plaintiff to a subcon-
tractor. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Stewart M. Hanson, J., en-
tered order dismissing action with preju-
dice and, from denial of motion to vacate 
order, plaintiff appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Crockett, J., held that order dismiss-
ing suit with prejudice on ground that 
plaintiff had failed to diligently prosecute 
action was an abuse of discretion, notwith-
standing unusual delay in getting case to 
t n a \ Vnere &e\ay %vas frue in Yatgt part to 
unusual circumstances of case, such as 
enormity of discovery materials, and de-
fendants not only failed to manifest any 
particular haste in getting pretrial discov-
ery procedures completed, but failed to act 
responsively when plaintiff assembled rec-
ords- and sent messages as to their avail-
ability. 
Order vacated, and case remanded. 
Henriod, C. J., dissented and filed 
opinion. 
I. Dismissal and Nonsuit C=60(l) 
In order to handle business of court 
with efficiency and expedition, trial court 
should have a reasonable latitude of discre-
tion in dismissing an action for failure to 
prosecute if a party fails to move forward 
according to rules and directions of court, 
without justifiable excuse, but such prerog-
ative falls short of unreasonable and arbi-
trary action which will result in injustice. 
Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 37, 55(c), 
60(b). 
2. Dismissal and Nonsuit 0=60(3) 
Whether there is a justifiable excuse 
for a failure to prosecute is to be deter-
mined by • considering more factors than 
merely length of time from filing suit; 
some consideration should be given to the 
conduct of both parties, and to the oppor-
tunity each has had to move the case for-
ward and what they have done about it, to-
gether with the difficulty or prejudice that 
might have been caused to the other side, 
and the injustice that might result from a 
dismissal. Rules of Civil Procedure, rules 
37, 55(c), 60(b). 
3. Dismissal and Nonsuit C=>60(6) 
Order dismissing suit with prejudice 
on ground that plaintiff had failed to dili-
gently prosecute action was an abuse of 
discretion, notwithstanding unusual delay 
in getting case to trial, where delay was 
due in large part to unusual circumstances 
of case, such as enormity of discovery ma-
terials,,-and defendants not only failed to 
manifest any particular haste in getting 
pretrial discovery procedures completed, 
but failed to act responsively when plain-
tiff assembled records and sent messages 
as to their availability. Rules of Civil 
Procedure, rules 37, 55(c), 60(b). 
C. R. Henrikson, of Hennkson, Fair-
bourn & Tate, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff 
and appellant. 
Joseph J. Palmer, of Moyle & Draper, 
Salt Lake City, for Skyline and General. 
Harry D. Pugsley, Salt Lake City, for 
Larsen. 
CROCKETT, Justice: 
Westinghouse Electric Supply Company 
sued Skyline Construction, general contrac-
tor, for balance due for electrical equip-
ment it had supplied to a subcontractor, 
Paul W. Larsen Contractor, Inc., for con-
struction of the Behavioral Science Build-
tion to the time involved in reciprocal 
pleadings, considerable time was consumed 
in connection with discovery procedures. 
As a result of the delays, the trial court 
granted defendants' motion to dismiss on 
the ground that plaintiff had failed to dili-
gently prosecute the action2; and included 
in its order that the action is "dismissed 
with prejudice" and that, " . . . this 
judgment be and is hereby determined to 
be a final judgment." 
Plaintiff filed motions to vacate the or-
der; and also to delete therefrom the just 
quoted provisions and grant a trial on the 
merits. From a denial of these motions 
plaintiff appeals, contending that the court 
abused its discretion. 
In performing its subcontract to install 
the electrical system and equipment, Larsen 
purchased its supplies from Westinghouse. 
Defendant General Insurance Company of 
America furnished the required bond to in-
sure payments to material men.3 During 
the course of construction, in 1970, Larsen 
fell into financial difficulties and was un-
able to keep current its payments to West-
inghouse. In order to assure Westinghouse 
would be paid, in May of that year, the 
three parties agreed that thereafter Skyline 
would make Larsen's checks payable joint-
ly to Larsen and Westinghouse and that 
future purchases were to be approved by 
Skyline, ordered on its forms and invoiced 
to Skyline. 
Despite this arrangement, difficulties 
still persisted in getting the account paid. 
Westinghouse gave formal notice on Feb-
ruary 25,' 1971, requiring payment by Sky-
line and/or its bondsman General Insur-
ance. Payment not being forthcoming, on 
July 14, 1971, Westinghouse's counsel 
wrote to Skyline claiming $41,357.22 for 
1. The essential facts recited herein are sub-
stantially without dispute as shown by the 
record and the affidavit of Westinghouse's 
counsel. 
2. Rule 41(b), U.R.C.P. provides that: For 
failure of the plaintiff to prosecute a defend-
ant may move for dismissal of an action. 
materials iurnisfted to Larsen, of which 
$22,541.14 was invoiced to Skyline. On 
February 10, 1972, Westinghouse com-
menced this action against Skyline, Larsen, 
and General Insurance for the $41,357.22. 
(Larsen is not a party to this appeal. For 
that reason, its dealings with Westinghouse 
and its conduct in the lawsuit are not dis-
cussed. Skyline and General are hereafter 
referred to collectively as "defendants.") 
On February 17, 1972, defendants filed a 
motion to dismiss Westinghouse's com-
plaint for failure to state the date of last 
delivery of materials.4 And, on the same 
day, defendants' counsel wrote Westing-
house's counsel and requested that West-
inghouse collect the invoices on those 
goods sold directly to Larsen and provide a 
record of all payments by either Skyline or 
Larsen. 
It is indicated that some efforts were 
made to settle the matter. But after it ap-
peared that they would not be successful, 
Westinghouse noticed up for hearing de-
fendants' motion to dismiss on July 20, 
1973. The following month, on August 15, 
1973, defendants filed a motion to dismiss 
on the^additronal ground of failure to pros-
ecute the action and in a supporting affi-
davit stated: 
That Westinghouse had not produced 
the invoices and records requested; that 
in September, 1972, Skyline had assigned 
its assets for benefit of its creditors; 
that in October, 1972, Larsen had discon-
tinued operations and gone into receiver-
ship ; and that, due to the insolvency and 
the release of employees who had knowl-
edge of the materials used and Westing-
house's failure to provide requested in-
formation, the defendants' ability to de-
fend the action was substantially im-
paired. 
3. Pursuant to § 14-1-5, U.C.A.1953. 
4. Sec. 14-1-6, U.C.A.1953, requires written 
notice to the general contractor within 90 
days and that suit be commenced within one 
year after the day on which the last labor 
or materials were supplied. 
The District Court denied both of the 
motions to dismiss on August 20, 1973, and 
allowed Westinghouse to amend the com-
plaint to allege the last date of delivery of 
materials, which it did the next day, Au-
gust 21, 1973. Shortly thereafter, on Sep-
tember 10, 1973, Westinghouse's counsel 
sent to the defendants copies of 102 unpaid 
invoices, 45 pertaining to the Larsen ac-
count and 57 pertaining to the Skyline ac-
count, with a letter requesting the defend-
ants to review the invoices as soon as pos-
sible, because they would be followed by 
interrogatories and other discovery proce-
dures. 
The defendants answered on September 
12, 1973, and filed a request that Westing-
house produce within one month, at the of-
fice of defendants' counsel, all documents 
pertaining to Westinghouse's claims: 
(1) purchase orders; (2) delivery receipts 
and invoices; (3) records as to payments; 
(4) any notices given by Westinghouse of 
claims on the performance bond; (5) all 
documents, notes, letters or memoranda 
pertaining to conversations; and (6) ail 
correspondence, between the parties. 
With respect to that demand, these facts 
are noteworthy: that it was a very exten-
sive request; and that much of the materi-
al requested, or copies thereof, should have 
already been in possession of the defend-
ants. Plaintiff Westinghouse is a large 
concern, having national and in fact 
world-wide operations, of which the Salt 
Lake City office is only a regional distri-
bution center. The electrical supplies in-
volved here had been shipped from various 
places and most of them directly from fac-
tories or distribution centers to this job; 
and each plant issued its own invoices and 
maintained its own records. 
It is further shown that after this de-
mand, from October, 1973, to May,' 1974, 
Westinghouse's personnel spent considera-
ble time and effort searching the compa-
ny's division depositories and its national 
5. That the making available of voluminous 
records satisfies such a demand see Sprague 
archive to obtain the documentation re-
quired and to transmit it to its Salt Lake 
City office. Counsel for Westinghouse 
telephoned the office of defendants' coun-
sel in May, 1974, and left a message that 
the records were at Westinghouse's office, 
but that due to their volume, defendants' 
counsel should come there to examine 
them. Again on July 15, 1974, counsel for 
Westinghouse telephoned the office of de-
fendants' counsel and, unable to speak with 
counsel, left a similar message. This was 
a substantial compliance with the request.5 
During October, 1974, Westinghouse's 
counsel prepared requests for admissions, 
interrogatories, and motions to produce 
which were to be served upon the defend-
ants after they had reviewed the docu-
ments and records gathered by Westing-
house in its office. But defendants' coun-
sel did not come to make such examination. 
Instead of doing so, on January 9, 1975, 
the defendants served their second motion 
to dismiss for failure of prosecution on the 
ground that Westinghouse had not deliv-
ered the documents fn accordance with de-
fendants' request. The following day, Jan-
uary 10, 1975, Westinghouse filed the in-
terrogatories, requests for admissions, and 
its own motion to produce documents. To 
this the defendants filed objections. It 
was upon that state of the record, and 
upon the basis of the above recited occur-
rences, that on February 27, 1975, the trial 
court granted the defendants' motion to 
dismiss. 
In the light of the foregoing, we turn to 
the sole issue presented to this appeal: 
whether the granting of that motion with 
prejudice was an abuse of discretion. 
[1,2] In doing so it is appropriate to 
have in mind some established principles 
applicable to such situations. It is not to 
be doubted that in order to handle the busi-
ness of the court with efficiency and expe-
dition the trial court should have a reason-
able latitude of discretion in dismissing for 
v. Boyles Bros. Drilling Co., 4 Utah 2d 344, 
294 P.2d 6S9 (1956). 
c i t e as 544 
failure to prosecute6 if a party fails to 
move forward according to the rules and 
the directions of the court, without justifi-
able excuse.7 But that prerogative falls 
short of unreasonable and arbitrary action 
which will result in injustice. Whether 
there is such justifiable excuse is to be de-
termined by considering more factors than 
merely the length of time since the suit 
was filed. Some consideration should be 
given to the conduct of both parties, and to 
the opportunity each has had to move the 
case forward and what they have done 
about it8; and also what difficulty or prej-
udice may have been caused to the other 
side; and most important, whether injus-
tice may result from the dismissal 
[3] Applying those principles here, 
these observations are pertinent: although 
there was unusual delay in getting this 
case to trial, this was due in large part to 
the unusual circumstances delineated 
above. Further, we are not impressed that 
the defendants themselves were overly dili-
gent or manifest any particular haste in 
getting the pretrial discovery procedures 
completed and on with the trial. They did 
not do so in responsive action to Westing-
house's having assembled records, nor to 
the latter's messages concerning their 
availability, nor did they seek any assist-
ance from the court.9 
It. is indeed commendable to handle cases 
with dispatch and to move calendars with 
expedition in order to keep them up to 
date. But it is even more important to 
keep in mind that the very reason for the 
existence of courts is to afford disputants 
an opportunity to be heard and to do jus-
tice between them. In conformity with 
that principle the courts generally tend to 
P.2d 876 
favor granting relief from default judg-
ments where there is any reasonable ex-
cuse, unless it will result in substantial 
prejudice or injustice to the adverse party.10 
It is our conclusion that the trial court 
failed to give proper weight to the higher 
priority; and that under the circumstances 
described herein, the order of dismissal 
was an abuse of discretion. It is therefore 
necessary that the order be vacated and the 
case remanded for further proceedings. 
Costs to plaintiff (appellant). 
ELLETT, TUCKETT and MAUGHAN, 
JJ., concur. 
HENRIOD, Chief Justice (dissenting): 
I dissent,—noting at the outset that the 
main opinion's footnote to its first sen-
tence, disarmingly emphasizes that "The 
essential facts recited herein are substan-
tially without dispute . . . "—which is 
not the test for reversal,—that being 
whether there are substantial believable 
facts to support the lower court. 
Plaintiff furnished equipment to Skyline, 
general contractor, and to Larsen, its sub-
contractor, starting in 1970 and continuing 
in 1971. Defendant, General Insurance, 
was the statutory1 surety to pay for such 
equipment if Skyline defaulted, which it 
apparently did, for an undetermined 
amount. Westinghouse claimed it was 
about $64,000, which defendants generally 
denied. 
Westinghouse sued on February 10, 1972, 
after unsuccessful negotiations for an ac-
counting and payment had been indulged 
by the parties for a considerable length of 
time prior to the institution of this litiga-
tion. The suit was prompted, apparently, 
6c See Thompson Ditch Co. v. Jackson, 29 9. As permitted by Rule 37, U.R.C.P. 
Utah 2d 259, 508 P.2d 52S (1973) ; Brasher 
Motor and Finance Co. v. Brown, 23 Utah 
2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 (1969). 
7. See Rule 37 U.R.C.P.; Maxfield v. Fishier, 
538 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1975). 
8. See Crystal Line & Cement Co. v. Robbins, 
8 Utah 2d 3S9, 335 P,2d 624 (1959) ; Wright 
v. Howe, 46 Utah 588, 150 P. 956 (1915). 
10. See Rule 55(c) and 60(b), U.R.C.P.; 
Heathman v. Fabian & Clendenin, 14 Utah 
2d 60, 377 P.2d 189 (1962) ; Utah Commer-
cial <& Savings Bank v. Trumbo, 17 Utah 
198, 53 P. 1033 (1898). 
I. Title 14-1-5, U.C.A.1953. 
..v, K.umyiy wun tne statutory requirement 
to file suit within one year after the test 
materials are furnished.2 There was no 
counterclaim,—only an answer. 
About 90% of the record consisted of 
communications, motions, memoranda, re-
quests ior production oi documents, inter-
rogatories, etc. 
The salient, believable, admissible facts 
that support the trial judge's decision, ar-
rived at by the exercise of his uiscretitfn, 
—which the rules say is his,—together 
with the principle that on appellate review, 
the trial judge is affirmed unless arbitrary 
and capricious to the point reflecting a 
clear abuse of discretion,3 fairly may be 
condensed thus: 
In 1970-71, plaintiff furnished materials 
to Skyline and Larsen, the general and 
subcontractor defendants. The last were 
delivered on October 27, 1971. The com-
plaint followed on February 2, 1972.4 A 
week later, on February 9, 1972, defend-
ants moved to dismiss for failure to state <* 
claim, which has little significance here. 
A couple of weeks later, on February £4, 
1972, defendant Larsen requested records 
of plaintiff, having to do with sales, deliv-
ery, payments, and the like.5 Plaintiff did 
not answer interrogatories presented until 
five months later, on July 17, 1972, and 
then simply responded to the effect that it 
had some receipts. 
A year and one month later, on August 
15, 1973, defendants, through their coun-
sel's affidavit, complained that plaintiff 
had not furnished the requested recoro15 
and filed a motion to dismiss under Riile 
41(b), "for failure . . . to prosecute 
. " Two days later, plaintiff's coun-
sel advised defendant's counsel that the 
records were ready. Five days later, on 
August 22, 1973, the motion was denied 
2. Title 14-1-6, U.C.A.1953. 
P.2d 528 (1973). 
4. During which period the parties appeared 
to have been trying to reconcile their ac-
counting. 
and plaintiff was given ten days to amend 
(obviously to allow plaintiff to allege when 
the last materials had been furnished, a 
fact plaintiff had neglected to allege in its 
complaint). About five months later, on 
January 9, 1975, which was about 15 
miss for lack of prosecution (August 15, 
1973, supra) and about three years after 
the complaint was filed, defendants again 
filed a motion to dismiss for failure to 
prosecute the action, as had been the case 
on August 15, 1973. There followed a 
number of motions, notices, memoranda, 
affidavits, etc. when the motion was grant-
ed dismissing the action with prejudice. 
During the three years this action was 
pending, the two defendants that primarily 
were obligated to pay for the materials went 
broke. 
There is substantial evidence to the ef-
fect that the delay presented a practical, 
difficult problem for the remaining defend-
ant,—the only one with means,-—to accu-
mulate evidence because of scattering of 
the personnel of the other two, coupled 
VvtYi t'ne circumstances ot dimming memo-
ries, all oj^which gave the remaining de-
fendant a rather slim chance of assuming a 
burden of going forward,—which basically 
was that of the plaintiff. 
Under the circumstances of this case, 
hardly can it be said that the trial judge's 
mandate arose out of an arbitrary or capri-
cious abuse of his discretion. 
On more than one occasion, this court 
has defended and affirmed such discretion-
ary orders against a charge of abuse, in 
cases appearing factually to justify affirm-
ance of the order here, as much as justi-
fied affirmance on the facts prevailing in 
those cases. About the most recent is 
Thompson Ditch z\ Jackson, 29 Utah 2d 
5. Which had to be gathered from out of state 
sources, making it difficult to examine in 
plaintiff's local office. 
mously we said: 
The ruling of the court below will not 
be disturbed on appeal unless the record 
plainly shows that the court beloW 
abused its discretion. The action of the 
court was taken in accordance with the 
provisions oi Ru\e <VHV) . . . ?& 
follows: . . . For failure 
to prosecute . . . 
It is to be noted that we sustained the 
order there on the merits, the order not 
having been made with or without preju-
dice. The rest of the same Rule 41(b) 
takes care of any such unspecific order 
when it states that: 
Unless the court in its order for dis-
missal otherwise specifies, a dismissal 
under this subdivision and any dismissal 
not provided for . . . operates as 
an adjudication on the merits. 
The plaintiff in its brief asked only 
"that this court reverse the trial court, 
reinstate appellant's action . . . and 
order the case to be set for trial upon the 
merits." It did not ask for a dismissal 
without prejudice, so that it would be ina-
propos for this court to send the case back 
for entry of an unsolicited order of dismis-
sal without prejudice,—which might initi-
ate a new round of protraction perhaps as 
great or greater than that prevailing to 
date. 
Besides Thompson Ditch v. Jackson, su-
pra, in Pacer v. Myers, 534 P.2d 616 (Utah 
1975), similar language was expressed, 
wherein, although not a case under Rule 
41(b), the court refused to set aside a de-
fault judgment, we said, "We, on appeal, 
should not. reverse its ruling except for 
abuse of discretion, to wit, that it is arbi-
trary, capricious, or not based on adequate 
findings of fact or on the law." 
Such was the case also in Brasher z'. 
Brown, 23 Utah 2d 247, 461 P.2d 464 
6. See also Haxfield v. Fishier, Utah, 538 P.2<* 
Bee. £&. 
mentioned but not the basis of the opinion, 
we said that the court has an inherent dis-
cretion, irrespective of the Rule, to dismiss 
for lack of prosecution and that in doing 
so we affirm unless there is manifest abuse 
of discretion reflected, adopting the rule 
reflected in Reed ^^  First Xatioual Bank, 
194 Or. 45, 241 P.2d 109 (1952), which 
said: 
In dismissing an action for want of 
prosecution, the court may proceed under 
the statute, or it may, of its own motion, 
take action to that end. In acting on its 
own motion, the court must proceed with 
judicial discretion. Its ruling will not be 
disturbed on appeal unless it is manifest 
from the record that the court's discre-
tion has been abused.6 
In my opinion the main opinion has sub-
stituted its own unwarranted choice of the 
evidence as a substitute for what many 
times we have held to be the prerogative 
of the fact-finder,—which we have said 
elsewhere is in an advantaged position to 
observe, discern, weigh, canvass, review 
and determine,—but not in the instant in-
One &t the" hallmarkian principles es-
poused by such opinion is that: 
Some consideration should be given to 
the conduct of both parties, and to the 
opportunity each has had to move the 
case forward and what they have done 
about it; and also what difficulty or 
prejudice may have been caused to the 
other side; and most important, what in-
justice may result from the dismissal. 
Applying such technique here, the evi-
dence eminently adjusts itself to such 
words of wisdom or platitudes, as one 
chooses,—which prompts me to suggest 
that the trial court here should be af-
firmed, since apparently such principles 
were considered. 
1323, this Court, and 24 Am.Jur. 49, Dismissal 
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A.L.R.3d 1087. 
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party" for purposes of awarding costs where 
both parties prevail on affirmative claims, 66 
A.L.R.3d 1115. 
Continuance of civil case as conditioned 
upon applicant's payment of costs or expenses 
incurred by other party, 9 A.L.R.4th 1144. 
Running of interest on judgment where both 
parties appeal, 11 A.L.R.4th 1099. 
Allocation of defense costs between primary 
and excess insurance carriers, 19 A.L.R.4th 
107. 
Authority of trial judge to impose costs or 
other sanctions against attorney who fails to 
appear at, or proceed with, scheduled trial, 29 
A.L.R.4th 160. 
Allowance of attorneys' fees in mandamus 
proceedings, 34 A.L.R.4th 457. 
Retrospective application and effect of state 
statute or rule allowing interest or changing 
rate of interest on judgments or verdicts, 41 
A.L.R.4th 694. 
Obduracy as basis for state-court award of 
attorneys' fees, 49 A.L.R.4th 825. 
Modern status of state court rules governing 
entry of judgment on multiple claims, 80 
A.L.R.4th 707. 
Recoverability of cost of computerized legal 
research under 28 USC § 1920 or Rule 54(d), 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 80 A.L.R. 
Fed. 168. 
Modern status of Federal Civil Procedure 
Rule 54(b) governing entry of judgment on 
multiple claims, 89 A.L.R. Fed. 514. 
Key Numbers. — Appeal and Error «=> 24 to 
135; Costs «=» 78 et seq., 195 et seq., 221 et seq.; 
Judgment «=> 1. 
Rule 55- Default 
(a) Default 
(1) Entry. When a party against whom a judgment for affirmative 
relief is sought has failed to plead or otherwise defend as provided by 
these rules and that fact is made to appear the clerk shall enter his 
default. 
(2) Notice to party in default. After the entry of the default of any 
party, as provided in Subdivision (a)(1) of this rule, it shall not be neces-
sary to give such party in default any notice of action taken or to be taken 
or to serve any notice or paper otherwise required by these rules to be 
served on a party to the action or proceeding, except as provided in Rule 
161 
Rule 55 UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
5(a), in Rule 58A(d) or in the event that it is necessary for the court to 
conduct a hearing with regard to the amount of damages of the 
nondefaulting party. 
(b) Judgment. Judgment by default may be entered as follows: 
(1) By the clerk. When the plaintiffs claim against a defendant is for 
a sum certain or for a sum which can by computation be made certain, 
and the defendant has been personally served otherwise than by publica-
tion or by personal service outside of this state, the clerk upon request of 
the plaintiff shall enter judgment for the amount due and costs against 
the defendant, if he has been defaulted for failure to appear and if he is 
not an infant or incompetent person. 
(2) By the court. In all other cases the party entitled to a judgment by 
default shall apply to the court therefor. If, in order to enable the court to 
enter judgment or to carry it into effect, it is necessary to take an account 
or to determine the amount of damages or to establish the truth of any 
averment by evidence or to make an investigation of any other matter, 
the court may conduct such hearings or order such references as it deems 
necessary and proper. 
(c) Setting aside default. For good cause shown the court may set aside an 
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise 
set it aside in accordance with Rule 60(b). 
(d) Plaintiffs, counterclaimants, cross-claimants. The provisions of this 
rule apply whether the party entitled to the judgment by default is a plaintiff, 
a third-party plaintiff, or a party who has pleaded a cross-claim or counter-
claim. In all cases a judgment by default is subject to the limitations of Rule 
54(c). 
(e) Judgment against the state or officer or agency thereof. No judg-
ment by default shall be entered against the state of Utah or against an officer 
or agency thereof unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief 
by evidence satisfactory to the court. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985.) 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to 
Rule 55, F.R.C.P. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Excusable neglect. 
—Judicial attitude. 
Damages. —Meritorious defense. 
Default. —Movant's duty. 
—Divorce action. —Setting aside proper. 
—Notice. Cited. 
—Time for appeal. 
Judgment. Damages. 
—Conduct of counsel. A default judgment establishes, as a matter 
—Default entry necessary. of law, that defendants are liable to plaintiff as 
—Failure to follow rule. to each cause of action alleged in the com-
—Hearing on merits. plaint. Nevertheless, it is still incumbent upon 
—Punitive damages. the nondefaulting party to establish by compe-
Setting aside default. tent evidence the amount of recoverable dam-
—Collateral attack. ages and costs he claims. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. 
—Direct attack. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah Ct. App. 
—Discretion of court. 1989). 
—Grounds. There is no right to a jury trial on the issue 
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Juror's voir dire denial or nondisclosure of Court reporter's death or disability prior to 
acquaintance or relationship with attorney in transcribing notes as grounds for reversal or 
case, or with partner or associate of such attor- new trial, 57 AX.R.4th 1049. 
ney, as ground for new trial or mistrial, 64 Excessiveness or adequacy of compensatory 
A.L.R.3d 126. damages for personal injury to or death of sea-
Amendment, after expiration of time for fil-
 m a n i n a c t i 0ns under Jones Act (46 USCS 
ing motion for new trial, in civil case, of motion
 A p p x § ggg) o r d o c t r i n e 0f unseaworthiness-
made in due time, 69 AX.R.3d 845
 m o d e r n c a s e s % A L R F e d 5 4 1 
Authority of state court to order jury trial in
 E x c e s s i v e n es s or adequacy of awards of dam-
civil case where jury has been waived or not
 a g e s f o r p e ^ ^ i n j u r y o r d e a t h i n a c t i ons un-
demanded by parties, 9 A.L.R.4th 1041. J n J i w i »?• L-I-X. A i / i c n o r c 
Deafness of juror as ground for impeaching *?**?* E ^ l ° ^ Liability Act (45 USCS 
verdict, or securing new trial or reversal on §§ 5 1 e t seq.)~modern cases, 97 A.L.R. Fed. 
appeal, 38 A.L.R.4th 1170. 189* _
 m , 
Jury trial waiver as binding on later state K e y Numbers. - New Trial «=> 13 et seq., 
civil trial, 48 A.L.R.4th 747. HO, 116. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order, 
(a) Clerical mistakes. Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other 
parts of the record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may 
be corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on the motion of 
any party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders* During the pen-
dency of an appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the appeal is 
docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending 
may be so corrected with leave of the appellate court. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
(4) when, for any cause, the summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by Rule 4(e) and the defendant has 
failed to appear in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment has 
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that 
the judgment should have prospective application; or (7) any other reason 
justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made 
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), or (4), not more than 3 
months after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A 
motion under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or 
suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the power of a court to enter-
tain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order or pro-
ceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these 
rules or by an independent action. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to to set aside judgment, §§ 78-3-16.5, 78-4-24, 
Rule 60, F.R.C.P. 78-6-14; Appx. G, Code of Judicial Administra-
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion tion. 
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